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The purpose of this t h e s is  is to prove the e x i s t e n c e  and strength 
of mid-Victorian humanitarian sentim ent .  The British government's  
pol icy  and resp o n se  to the Syrian m a s s a cr e s  and the Cretan rebel l ion  
s e rv e  as v e h i c l e s  to show the v i ta l i ty  and power of  humanitarianism 
that  was a part of the E v a n g e l ica l  re v iv a l .  This study will  further 
document the attempted re c o n c i l ia t io n  of  this humanitarian sentiment 
and Britain 's  pol icy  in the Near E a s t .
In a general  ch aracter izat ion  of  the unique mid-Victorian period of  
Brit ish h is to ry ,  humanitarianism wi l l  be i s o la t e d .  A humanitarian 
d e s i r e  to help wil l  oe shown to be a b a s is  for the British government's 
re s p o n s e  to the Syrian m a s s a cr e s  and to F ra n c e 's  proposal to intervene 
d ir e c t ly .  A motivating force  in R u s s e l l ' s  d e c is io n  to cooperate with the 
French was the fear of offending mid-Victor ian humanitarian sentim ent .  
The th e s is  w i l l  a lso  d i s c u s s  Lord S t a n le y ' s  claim that  non-intervention 
in the Cretan rebel l ion  w as  more humanitarian than intervention or 
refugee re m o v a l .
The debates  in the British Parl iam ent ,  the correspondence of the 
p r in c ip a ls ,  and the S e s s i o n a l  Papers of the House of Commons will
vi
document the government's attempts to c loak  its s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  
p o l ic ie s  with the mantle of hum anitar ianism . The f e a s ib i l i ty  of such 
a maneuver wi l l  be demonstrated by the s u c c e s s  of both R u sse l l  and 
Stan le y  in the defense  of their r e s p e c t iv e  p o l i c i e s .
CHAPTER I
M id-Victorian Humanitariamsm
The mid-Victorian period,  .1851 to 1 8 57 ,  was an era of equilibrium 
without paralle l  in British h is to ry .  Unique b a la n ce s  were found and 
maintained in the e con om ic ,  s o c i a l ,  and po l i t i ca l  a s p e c t s  of British 
l i f e .  The industria l and agricultural  problems of the  previous decade 
were much l e s s  s e v e r e ,  a s  Chart is t  unrest  was a memory and the 
agricultural in te re s ts  found unexpected prosperity in Free Trade.  A  
spir i t  of compromise pervaded English l i f e ,  and it was  only with the 
d e p ress io n s  of the 1370 's  that  this "Age of Equipoise"  d is so lv e d  again 
into economic and s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t .
M id-Victor ian  econom ic  equilibrium was based on prosperity ,  and 
British agriculture and industry en joyed an unprecedented prosperity 
from 1851 to 1 8 6 7 .  Food w as  cheaper with the rep ea l  of the Corn Laws. 
Consumer items were more read i ly  a v a i la b le  and of better  q u a l i ty ,  * 
b e c a u s e  of the great  adv an ce s  result ing from English  industr iousness  , 
o u s in e s s  e f f i c i e n c y ,  and private e n te rp r ise .^
-*-Asa Briggs,  " 1 8 5 1 , "  in From M etternich  to Hit ler :  A sp ects  of 
Brit ish and Foreign History,  1 8 1 4 - 1 9 3 9 , ed .  by W il l iam  N. M edlico tt  
(New York: Barnes arid N oble ,  I n c . ,  19 6 3 ) ,  p. 70 .
^David Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore,
M d . :  Penguin, 1 9 5 0 ) ,  p. 1 0 0 .
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tproved methods of t ransportat ion,  result ing from the development of 
ra il road s y s te m ,  added to English  prosperity .  5 Real wages  r o s e  from 
300 to 1350; and they continued to r i se  from 1850 to 1 8 7 4 , 4  as  much as 
fty per cent  for most of the c h ie f  o c c u p a t i o n s . s As the material l i fe  
t the nation improved v as t ly  during the e r a ,  a spiri t  of materia lism 
ecarne widespread It a c tu a l ly  was p o s s ib le  to r a i s e  o n e 's  s ta tu s ;  hence  
te prosp ects  of the middle and lower c l a s s e s  were improved.® Prosperity 
s s s e n e d  c l a s s  c o n f l i c t ,  as  the  poverty of  the lower c l a s s e s  becam e 
s la t iv e ly  l e s s  and the opportunities  of the poor becam e theo re t ica l ly  
r e a t e r .
The C rysta l  P a la c e  and i t s  contents  from around the world gave 
concrete proof of  an improvement in l i f e .  The mid-Victorians had great 
ropes for the future of internat ional  re la t io n s  , as  the great nat ions  of the 
vorld provided e x h ib i ts  of the ir  own p ro g re s s .  Events such as  the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 and the S u l ta n 's  v i s i t  to Europe in 1867 in c re a se d  the 
impression that progress  w as  p o s s ib le  in in ternat ional cooperat ion .  The
David C .  So m erv e l l ,  "The Vic torian A g e ," in From Metternich  to 
Hitler:  Aspects  o f  British and Foreign H istory ,  1 8 1 4 - 1 9 3 9 ,  e d . by 
Wil liam N. M ed lico t t  (New York: Barnes and Noble ,  I n c . ,  1 9 6 3 ) ,  p. 74 .
4 r . Max Hartwell ,  "The Rising Standard of Living in England,  1 8 0 0 -  
1 3 5 0 , "  in European Pol i t ica l  H is t o r y , 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 7 0 :  A sp ects  of  L ibera l ism , 
e d . by Eugene C .  Black (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) ,  p p . 1 3 - 4 5 .
®Agnes F.  Young and Elwyn T. Ashton,  British S o c ia l  WorK in the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul ,  1956) ,  p. 2 4 .
^William L. Burn, fhe Age of Equipoise ;  a Study of the M id-Victor ian  
G e n e r a t i o n (New York: Norton, 1964) ,  p. 68 .
Crysta l  Pa lace  contained the products of world industr ia l progress and 
was an example of  what the world could do,  if  nations cooperated.  
Europe seemed to be or. the brink of a new era of p e a c e  and s t a b i l i t y .  
The v i s i t  of the Sultan  created the im pression that even  tyrants could be 
dealt with re a s o n a b ly  and would a c ce p t  the precepts o f  world c o o p e r a ­
tion and p e a c e .  English  s o c i e t y  was brought to a fe e l in g  of optimism 
and hope for the future by such international events and b e c a u s e  o f  the 
benefi ts  of the industr ia l  r e v o l u t i o n .7
Prosperity and optimism created an environment in which the mid- 
l i c t o r i a n s  be l ieved  that th ey ,  as  indiv iduals ,  could improve their  
condit ion.  S o c ia l  mobil ity ,  whether real  or i l lu s io n a ry ,  was an impor­
tant fac tor  in reco n c i l in g  the people to Brit ish industria l s o c ie ty  and 
c iv i l i z a t io n .  If a man felt  that his prospects  were good,  he would more 
readily a c c e p t  the conditions of his present  e x i s t e n c e ;  and he o f ten  
ce s i re d  merely a larger  share of the w e a l th .  S o c ia l  change appeared 
nor?  a t t ra c t iv e  to him only if  he fel t  locked in his s t a t u s .  A member of 
he m id d le - c la s s  , an industr ia l laborer ,  or an agricultural  worker was 
able to fe e l  that he could r i s e  to a higher rank in his h ierarch y .  If  a 
tenant be l ieved  that  it was p o s s ib le  for him to become the owner, he 
was l e s s  l ike ly  to revolt a g a in s t  sue!, an e l a s t i c  s y s te m .
The mid-Victorians  bel ieved  that an individual had complete
^Asa Briggs , Victorian People:  A R e a s s e s s m e n t  o f  Persons and 
Themes,  1 8 5 1 -6 7  (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) ,  p p . 2 5 - 5 3 .
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control over his own fa te .  Everyone had the  power of  w i l l ,  the innate 
energy ,  and the opportunity to improve his  posit ion on the s o c i a l  
s c a l e .  A disadvantaged individual could fight his way up in s o c i e t y  by 
means o f  s e l f - h e l p .  D i f f icu l t ie s  and suffering acted as  stimuli to the 
" tru e-h ear ted "  laborer  to d is c ip l in e  h im s e l f ,  and thus ,  naturally r a i s e  
his s ta tu s  spiri tual ly  and moral ly .® S o c i e ty  was good; those  in poverty 
were r e s p o n s ib le  for their f a i l i n g s .  B e ca u se  of this b e l i e f  in the 
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of e a c h  person for his own condit ion,  an u p p e r - c la s s  mid- 
Victorian was often  complacent  s in c e  he exp e cted  others to help them ­
s e l v e s .  The ben ef i t s  of the s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n o lo g ic a l  adv ances  of 
the industr ia l revolution were c lear ly  reco g n iz e d .  The mid-Victorians 
bel ieved that l a i s s e z  faire contributed to the progress of British s o c ie t y  
and to the exp e cta t io n  of further prog ress .  New inventions and ideas  
would e l im inate  many of the e v i ls  of  the present .
As England was demonstrating that it  was  " p o s s i b l e  to r e c o n c i le  
econom ic  change and individual mobility with tradit ional s o c ia l  b a la n ce  
and s t a b i l i t y ," ~ prosperity and com p lacen cy  were producing a p o l i t i c a l  
equil ibrium. Th ese  atti tudes deflated p o l i t i c a l  f e e l i n g s ,  and p o l i t i c s  and 
i s s u e s  were  re legated  to a personal l e v e l .  The co n f l i c t s  over protection 
in the 1 6 4 0 ' s  were mel lowing, and the strongly party-oriented c o n fro n ­
tat ions  between G ladstone  and D is re a l i  were in the future. The Bri t ish
®Burn, The Age of  E q u ip o is e , p.  100 .
®Asa Briggs , The Age of Improvement, 1 7 8 3 - 1 8 6 7  (London:
Longmans, Green, ana C o.  , Ltd. , 1959), p. 4 0 4 .
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were dis tracted  from the problems of f ran ch ise  reform by Palmerston 's  
sk i l l fu l  employment of foreign a f f a i r s .  This avoidance  of reform was 
not rea l ly  d is l iked by any of the p o l i t ica l  groups, as  ev °n  the R a d ic a ls ,  
Cobden and Bright,  advocated only a s l ig ht  widening o f  the f r a n c h is e .
A manipulator,  such  as Lord Palm erston,  was able  to dominate the 
government,  b e c a u s e  the three main groups in British s o c i e t y ,  the 
a g r ic u l tu ra l i s t s ,  the in d u s t r ia l i s t s ,  and the ar t isan  c l a s s  could counter­
b a lan ce  one another .  The great  party movements of the 1 8 70 's  and 1 8 80 's  
would be complete ly  a l ien  to the 1 8 5 0 's  and 1 8 6 0 ' s .  M id-Victor ian  
p o l i t ic ians  were not democrats  , but they did b e l ie v e  that  inst i tu tions  
should be resp o n siv e  to the d e s i re s  of  the governed. Progress would 
come through free d i s c u s s i o n ,  which w as  encouraged in a nominally 
representat ive parliament.  They bel ieved that people should be s a t i s f i e d  
with a limited role in this government.  ^  Pol i t ic ian s  general ly  were not 
bound by s t r ic t  pr inciples  and were w i s e  enough to a d ju s t  to evolving 
c i r cu m s ta n c e s .  W ith  prosperity and co m p lacen cy ,  there was l i t t l e  
pressure for real  change on th e  p o l i t i ca l  l e v e l ,  thus through compromise 
and d is c u s s io n  a p o l i t i ca l  equilibrium was maintained throughout the mid- 
Victorian years .
The s o c ia l  equilibrium of  the mid-Victorian period was a ls o  a 
product o f  the prosperity of the era .  An important fac tor  in this s o c i a l
-^Brit ish Broadcasting Corporation, Ideas  and Be l ie fs  of the 
Vic torians :  An H is tor ic  Revaluation of the Victorian Age (London:
Sylvan P r e s s ,  194 9 ) ,  p.  3 3 7 .
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b a lan ce  was a humanitananism produced by e v a n g e l ic a l  re l ig ious 
b e l i e f s .  The Evangel ica l  Movement "transformed the whole  character  
of English s o c ie ty  and imparted to the Victorian age that moral e a r n e s t ­
n ess  which was its dis t inguishing  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . " ^  Although 
organized relig ion in England w as  atrophying, the a t t i tudes  and id e a ls  
of the Ev an g el ica l  Movement were becoming an integral b e l i e f  of a l l  
Englishmen: A n g l ican s ,  d i s s e n t e r s ,  and u n b e l ie v e rs .  Being C a l v i n i s t i c ,  
it permitted those with 'wealth to f e e l  better  about i t ,  b e c a u s e  they were 
of the " e l e c t . "  God would naturally favor in this  l i fe  th o s e  who were 
s a v e d .  Those  who had l i t t le  were encouraged to look forward to their  
reward in the next world. "The e l i t e  of the working c l a s s  , the hardwork­
ing and cap ab le  bourgeois , had been imbued by the Ev an g el ica l  Movement 
with a spir it  from which the e s ta b l i s h e d  order had nothing to f e a r . "  12 
Englishmen who were imbued with the ideals  of the Ev an g el ica l  Movement 
were slow to a c t  a g a in s t  s o c i e t y ,  b e c a u s e  t h e s e  rel ig ious convic t ions  
had produced a tremendous devotion and r e s p e c t  for the s o c i a l  order.
W e s le y i s m  induced a " s o b e r  m ora l i ty ,"  while  re s p e c ta b i l i ty  and 
s o c ie t y  were sa n c t i f ied  by re l ig io n .  The Ev an g el ica l  ideal  encouraged 
moral reform, then s o c i a l  reform, and eventual ly  p o l i t i c a l  reform. 1*
1 : Ei ie  Halevy,  Victorian Years  , 1 8 4 1 - 1 8 9 5 , trans . by E . I .  Watkins
(London: Ernest  Benn, L t d . ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,  p. 4 3 7 .
^ E l i e  Halevy,  England in 1 8 1 5 , t r a n s .  by E . I .  W a t k in s  and
D .  A. Barker (New York: Barnes and Noble ,  1960) ,  pp. 4 2 4 - 2 5 .
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Private  philanthropy was the duty of a good C h r is t ia n .  What mattered 
w as  not how w ealth  was acquired ,  but how it was  spent .  God entrusted 
men with personal  wealth  from which they were to extract  their  ju s t  due.  
The remainder was to be given back to God through the medium of aid to 
the poor. Philanthropic  endeavors becam e popular and t h e s e  efforts 
promoted the s a n c t i f i c a t io n  of the nation through voluntary s o c i e t i e s  and 
limited government a c t io n .  13 The u s e fu ln e s s  of  good works was  reaso n  
enough for mid-Victorians to engage in humanitarian endeavors as a 
means of s e l f - h e l p  to improve th em se lv e s  in the ey es  of th e ir  Creator .  
The real  driving force behind humanitarianism w as re l ig ion ,  b e c a u s e  
reform could be a means of rep entance  and atonem ent .  ^
This humanitarianism expla ined why the mid-Victorians considered 
th em selv e s  enlightened enough not to need, or even d e s i r e ,  s ta te  in te r ­
fe re n c e  in their  l i v e s . * 43 Although rugged individualism and l a i s s e z  
fa ire  were id e a ls  of the mid-Victorian generat ion ,  their e f fe c t iv e  p ra c t i ce  
w as  a l le v ia te d  by other fac tors ;  a genuine humanitarianism w as  exp e cted  
to l e s s e n  c o n f l i c t  and e x p lo i ta t io n .  The mid-Victorians b e l ie v ed  that 
employers would a c t  in a humane manner simply b e c a u s e  th o se  in control 
could se e  p o s i t iv e  gains in good working and living condit ions for the
43Jo s e f  L. Altholz , The Church in the Nineteenth Century (New7 York; 
B o b b s -M e rr i l l  Company , Tuc. . 19 6 7 ) ,  pp . 3 2 - 3 3 .
14British Broadcasting Corporation, Ideas and be l ie fs  of the 
Vic to r ian s  , pp . 2 47 -5  2 .
43W il l iam  L. Burn, " The Age of Equipoise:  England, 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 8 , ” 
The Nineteenth C en tu ry , CXLVI (October,  1949) ,  22 4.
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lower c l a s s e s  . Humanitarianism w as  in the b e s t  in teres ts  o f  a l l ,  and 
th u s ,  the o pt im is t ic  mid-Victorians believed s o c ie t y  would naturally 
adopt it .  They were complacent  and o pt im is t ic  enough to b e l ie v e  that 
b e c a u s e  of the spiritual gain  from philanthropy there was l i t t l e  need of  
anything more than a p a s s iv e  encouragement of  this virtue by the gov ern­
ment.  The upper c l a s s  would gain spiritual co n so la t io n  and reward by 
their  endeavors , while the lower c l a s s  would r e c e iv e  mater ia l benef i ts  
from these  g i f ts  and a t ta in  spiri tual  rewards by accept ing  the s ta tus  quo.
The mid-Victorians considered t h e s e  fe e l in g s  of  humanitarian in te re s t  
in the welfare  of the human race  as  one of their  primary c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  .
It was a lso  an important element in the equilibrium e s ta b l i s h e d  in mid- 
Victorian Britain . British governments had to take  care that  their  p o l i c ie s  
were a c c e p t a b le  to t h e s e  sentim ents  . If an opportunity to aid  suffering 
people  presented i t s e l f ,  many mid-Victorians  exp ected  the government 
to part ic ipate in any ameliorating a c t i v i t i e s .  Id e a l ly ,  t h e s e  a c t s  of 
philanthropy were supposed to be in the in teres ts  of  the re c ip ie n ts  and 
not for any ulterior  British i n t e r e s t s .  D esp ite  t h e s e  a t t i tu d e s ,  the 
Brit ish government had to maintain cer ta in  p o l ic ie s  simply b e c a u s e  of 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  Various administrations  proceeded to c loak their  s e l f i s h  
p o l ic ie s  m a mantle of humanitarian co n ce rn .  This method o f  defending 
pol icy  is evident in the Brit ish handling of the Syrian c r i s i s  of 1860 and 
the Cretan reb e l l io n  of 1866 to 1869 .
Any national or re l ig ious  confl ic t  within the Ottoman empire 
naturally involved the reso lut ion  of the Eastern Q uest ion .  The Eastern
9
Q uest ion  was the problem of  who was to replace the Ottoman empire in 
the Balkans and on the S t r a i t s .  This heterogeneous and s t r a te g ic a l ly  
located  s ta te  continued to e x i s t  primarily b e c a u s e  the powers could not 
agree on a d iv is io n  of the sp o i ls  . The failure of the Ottoman government 
to adv 'V> into the nineteenth century and the sad condition of its 
administration were the prime causes  for the long expected d is so lu t io n  
of the empire.  The abominable  condition of Turkish rule often served 
as an e x c u s e  for the powers to meddle in Ottoman internal a f fa irs  . This 
meddling could involve a temporary intervention that could grow into a 
permanent o c c u p a t io n . The Porte,  the Turkish government,  w as  
attempting to reform i t s e l f ,  and,  thereby, foresta l l  any further d i s ­
memberment by the Chris t ian  European powers .
The powers rivaled ea ch  other throughout the empire in their  schem es 
e i ther  to reform and maintain the integrity of the empire or to destroy and 
re p la ce  i t .  Brita in ,  and often France ,  cooperated to maintain the integrity 
of  the Ottoman empire b e c a u s e  a weak Turkish rule was preferable  tc a 
strong Russian dominated s t a t e  that would be econom ica l ly  and p o l i t i c a l ly  
unfriendly to Britain and F r a n c e .
The British government sought to fo re s ta l l  the resolut ion of the 
Eastern  Question b e c a u s e  it was afraid that the problem would not be 
se t t le d  in the b e s t  in teres ts  o f  England. Although the government refrained 
from direct  intervention and from def in ite  future commitments , it tried to 
maintain the in tegrity of the empire by advis ing the Turkish government 
and by giving it verbal support in dip lomatic  matters . Britain became
10
more involved in Ottoman problems when Lord Palmerston,  a s  foreign 
s e c r e ta r y ,  promised to help the Turks as  much as  foreign government 
properly could. This support was primarily in the form of aid to  i i t ’p 
the Turkish s ta te  fu lf il l  the reform principles  proclaimed in the H att i -  
Sharif  of Gunaneh of  November 3 ,  1 8 3 9 . ^  One of the main o b je c t iv e s  
of th is  reform e d ic t  was to r a i s e  the s ta tu s  of the C h ris t ians  of  the 
Ottoman em pire .
Although Palm ers ton 's  in te re s t  in the condition of the Ottoman 
empire was b ased  on its p ra c t i ca l  u se  a s  a b lock  to Russian ex p an s io n ,  
some British p o l i t i c ia n s  and hum anitar ians ,  as  c o r e l i g i o n i s t s ,  a l t r u i s ­
t i c a l l y  displayed a particular  in teres t  in  the Ottoman C h r is t ian s  through­
out the nineteenth century. This in te re s t  was built  on a genuine concern 
for their  condit ion and part ia l ly  on motives of s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  If the Turks 
treated their  C h r is t ian  s u b je c t s  rea s o n a bly  w e l l ,  the powers would not 
have the mistreatment of C h r is t ian s  a s  a pretext  to intervene in Ottoman 
internal a f f a i r s .
After the Crimean W ar,  w hich  was fought to protect  the Ottoman 
C h r i s t ia n s ,  to maintain  the integrity o f  the Ottoman empire,  and to
^ F r e d e r i c k  S .  Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of 
Turkey, 1 8 3 0 - 4 1 , "  Part I I , Journal of Modern H is t o r y , II (June, 1 9 3 0 ) ,  
2 0 5 .  Palmerston w a s  supporting the Ottoman empire a g a in s t  an 
Egyptian a t tack  and trying to counter the Russian dominance produced 
by the Treaty of U n k i a r - S k e l e s s i  of 1833 which had vir tually p laced 
Turkey under the mili tary protection of an  e x p a n s io n is t  R u s s ia .  The 
reform ed ic t  promised: se cu r i ty  of l i fe  and property, a f ixed method of 
ta x  c o l l e c t i o n ,  mil itary reforms,  and a somewhat rep re se n ta t iv e  counci l
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contain  Russian e x p a n s io n ,  the  Turkish government promulgated the 
Haiti  Humayun of February 18, 1 8 56 .  Issued in res p o n se  to the 
su g g est io n s  of France and Britain , this reform edict  promised "co m p le te  
personal  l iber ty ,  equal i ty  before the law, freedom of c o n s c i e n c e ,  
e l ig ib i l i ty  for c iv i l  and military o f f i c e ,  equali ty  of ta x a t io n ,  equal 
representat ion in the communal and provincial co un c i ls  auu in the
1 7Supreme Court of J u s t i c e ,  and complete  se cu r i ty  of person and property."
In other words , the Turkish government attempted through le g i s la t io n  a 
complete reform of Ottoman l i f e  and total rev ersa l  of the trends of the 
previous three hundred y e a r s .
These reforms were not mere hypocrisy to s a t i s f y  French and British 
pressure ,  but perhaps honest  attempts by the Turks to maintain the 
Ottoman Empire on the b a s is  o f  fusion between the Moslems and the 
Ch . i a n s . 1® Be s ide s  immense economic  d i f f icu l t ies  which made 
reform alm ost  im p o ss ib le ,  ^  the reforms were defeated by Moslem i n ­
to lerance  and in e r t ia ,  the C h r is t ian s '  d e s ire  to be free of Turkish contro l ,
^ G o r d o n  Isem inger ,  "The Hat.ti- Humayun, 1 8 5 6 - 1 8 6 0 :  An Attempt 
at  Precip ita te  W e s t e r n i z a t i o n ,"  North Dakota Q u arter ly , XXXVI (Winter,  
19 6 8 ) ,  3 3 .
-^ R o d e r ic H .  D a v is o n ,  "Turkish Attitudes Concerning C h r is t ia n -  
Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth C e n tu ry ,"  American H is to r ica l  
R e v ie w , LIX (July, 1954) ,  8 4 9 .
^ F r e d e r i c k s .  Rodkey, "Ottoman Concern about W e s te rn  Economic 
Penetrat ion in the Levant ,  1 8 4 9 - 1 8 5 6 , "  Tournal of Modern H i s t o r y ,
XXX (March,  1958) ,  3 4 8 .
the lack of  good adm inistrative personnel ,  a haphazard execu t ion  of 
the law, and foreign interference  in Ottoman internal a f f a i r s .  W i t h ­
out th ese  modernizing reforms , th e  fusion and brotherhood, on which
O I
a heterogeneous empire could be bui l t ,  was im p o s s ib le .  This fa i lure  
and s lo w n e s s  of Ottoman reform s e t  the s ta g e  for the two c r i s e s  that 
aroused British concern in the Levant in 1860 and again  in 1866 .  The 
British government b ased  its re s p o n s e  on s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  but defended 
its policy by c iting humanitarian motives .
L '^Roderic H. D a v is o n ,  Reform in tiie Ottoman Empire, 1 8 5 6 - 1 8 7 6  
(Princeton, N . J . :  Princeton Universi ty  Press  , 1963) ,  p. 92 .
“ 1D a v is o n ,  " Turkish Attitudes , "  p. 8 6 4 .
CHAPTER II
M a s s a c r e s  in Syria and Lebanon
The Brit ish government 's  re s p o n s e  to the c r i s i s  in Syria  and 
Lebanon in 1860 se rv e s  a s  an i l lu s tra t io n  of the strength of humanitarian 
sentim ent  during the mid-Victorian era .  The resp onse  a l s o  demonstrates  
the w i l l in g n e r’ '' to c lo a k  a policy b ased  on s e l f - i n t e r e s t  with a professed  
d e s ire  to aid a wretched and h e lp le s s  people .
In la te  May of 1860 , v io le n c e  broke out in Lebanon between the 
Maronites  and the D r u s e s .  The la t t e r ,  provoked by the murders and 
threats  of the Maronites  and being by nature more warlike,  soon got the 
bet ter  of the c o n f l i c t ,  s laughtering hundreds of Maronites  and d e v asta t in g  
their  land. At E e i r -e l - K a m a r  the Turks cooperated with the Druses and 
arranged the s laughter  o f  some Maronites  whom they were supposed to be 
p r o te c t in g . L C o n su l -G e n e ra l  Niven Moore o f  Beirut la ter  re lated that 
many refugees  were undergoing gre a t  suffering and deprivat ion. W om en,  
ch i ldren ,  the  old ,  and the infirm were wandering the countryside hunted 
l ike  wild b o a s t s  by the D r u s e s . 2
^Great Britain, House of Commons , Accounts  and Papers , LXIX 
(1860) ,  Papers Relating to the D is tu rb a n ce s  in Syria :  Tune 1860 
[hereafter  c i te d  as  Papers Relating to the D is tu rb an ce s  in S y r ia : June 
1860] , in c lo su re  no. 10 in no. 4 ,  Moore to Bulwer, June 3 ,  1860.
^ Ib id . , inc losure  no .  S i n  no.  17,  Moore to Bulwer , June 2 1 , 1 8 6 0 .
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On July 5 ,  1 8 60 ,  Edouard-Antoine Thouvenel,  the French foreign 
m in is ter ,  spuke with Lord C ow ley ,  the capab le  British am bassador  at 
Paris , about the s laughter  occurring in Lebanon and the Turkish re s p o n se  
to the ev ents  . He a l s o  inquired how France and Britain might cooperate  
to a l l e v ia te  the problem . Thouvenel c ited Lae imporency of  the Turks 
and the great  public  indignation in France over the m a s s a c r e s  as  c a u s e s  
for his c o n c e r n .  Cowley replied that  the Maronites had foo l i sh ly  
threatened and provoked the D ruses  and that according to the Treaty o f  
Paris of 185 6 ,  the powers had no right to intervene in Ottoman internal 
a f f a i r s . ^
On July 9 ,  a large number of Moslems of D am ascus a t ta ck e d  and 
m a ss a cre d  thousands of  C h r i s t ia n s .  Envy and the tradit ional hatred 
between M oslem s and C h r is t ian s  were the primary c a t a l y s t s  of this 
s laughter  and lo o t in g .  Having heard about the s u c c e s s  of the Druses , 
th e  Moslem c i t iz e n s  of  D am ascu s  gladly a t tack ed  the c i t y ' s  Christ ian  
population.  O nce  ag a in  the Turkish o f f i c ia l s  were considered  to be 
partia lly  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  e i ther  out of connivance  or in c a p a c i ty .  Consul 
Jam es  Brant, who was in the c i ty  reported that the Ottoman o f f i c ia l s
^Great Brita in , House of Commons, Accounts  and Papers , LXVIII 
(1 8 6 1 ) ,  Correspondence  Relating to the Affairs of Syria;  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 ,
Part I [hereafter  c ited a s  Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of 
Syria :  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 ,  P a r t i ] ,  no. 1, Cowley to R u s s e l l , July 5 , 1 860 .
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were at fault and had a c tu a l ly  helped xn the s laughter  and loot ing.
Brandt ca l led  the conduct of the ' iurkish governor of D a m a s cu s ,
AhmeJ P a sh a ,  shameful ano be l ieved  that firm Turkish efforts to res tore  
order would have quickly  stopped the m a s s a c r e s .  4 Ottoman in ca p a c i ty  
to govern and to protect  tne native Christ ians  from Moslem fan at ic ism  
was once  again  demonstrated to Europe. The s i tuation  appeared to 
demand an intervention by the powers in order to protect  the Maronites  
and the Chris t ians  of D a m a s c u s .  The British government was faced  with 
a dilemma. To maintain the tradit ional British policy of  non-in tervention 
in the fa ce  of  such a c t io n  by the l o c a l  o f f i c ia l s  of the Ottoman govern­
ment was c le a r ly  going to be dif f icult  for the government of  Lord 
P a lm e rs to n .
The horrors that took p lace  in Dam ascus caused  Napoleon III and 
Thouvenel to res o lv e  on defin ite  a c t io n .  The French proposed that  a 
military force and a jo int  com m iss ion  of inquiry be sent  d irect ly  to Syria 
and Lebanon. France offered to a c t  as  the agent of the other  powers and 
supply most of  the needed military fo r c e .  A protocol was to be 
negotia ted by the powers , and la ter  a convention was to make the 
agreement o f f i c i a l . This protocol was to determine the number of troops
^Great Britain, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers , LXIX 
(1660) ,  Further Papers Relating to the D is tu rb an ce s  in Syria:  June 1860 
[hereafter  c i te d  as Further Papers Relating to the D is tu rban ces  in S y r ia : 
June 1 8 6 0 ] , inc losure  no .  7 in no.  2 1 ,  Brant to Moore, July 10, 1860; 
no. 2 3 ,  Brant to R u s s e l l , July 16 , 1 8 6 0 .
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to be involved and to s e t  a date for their return from Sy r ia ,  barring 
unforeseen c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  The expedit ion was to cooperate  with the 
Turks and put an end to the c a rn a g e .  France w as  trying to help the 
C h ris t ians  of Syria by protect ing them from Moslem f a n a t ic i s m .  5 
Thouvenel was  request ing British cooperation in the venture which was  
desm_ned ro be an a c t  of charity for the vic t im s of Turkish perfidy or 
in c a p a c i ty .  Unless  the British C ab in et  was wil l ing to r i sk  offending 
mid-Victorian sentim ents  that demanded aid to suffering and deprived 
human b e i n g s ,  it had to cooperate  with the proposed French a id .
Thouvenel c o n s is te n t ly  emphasized the humanitarianism of the 
intervention by citing the cruelty of the Moslems and the Turks'  lack  
of a c t io n .  French public  opinion demanded the  expedit ion b e c a u s e  it  
was  an aid to a needy and persecuted people .  W hile  admitting F r a n c e 's  
s p e c i a l  in te re s t  in the M a ro n i tes ,  Thouvenel c laimed that intervention 
w as  n e c e s s a r y  to maintain peace  in the Levant and to protect  the 
integrity of  the Ottoman empire.^
5 Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of  Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 , Part I , 
no.  9,  Cowley to R u s s e l l , July 17 ,  1860; no. 11,  Thouvenel to 
Persigny,  July 17,  1860 .
6Alyce E. Mange, The Near Eastern  Pol icy  of the Emperor 
Napoleon I I I , I l l in o is  Studies  in the S o c ia l  S c i e n c e s ,  Vol.  XXV, nos. 1 -2  
(Urbana , 111.: The Universi ty of I l l in o is  P r e s s ,  1940) ,  pp. 8 3 - 8 8 .
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There can be l i t t le  dcubt that humanitarian in teres ts  did motivate 
the French to in tervene ,   ̂ but there were other r e a s o n s .  The intervention 
was a ls o  designed to d is t ra c t  and r e c o n c i le  C a th o l ic s  who had been
O
al ien ate d  by N apoleon 's  ac t io n s  in I ta ly .  Added to t h e s e  p o l i t i c a l  
con s ide ra t ion s  were F ra n c e 's  econom ic  in teres ts  in Syria and Lebanon.
A vague plot e x is te d  to help a transplanted Algerian,  A b d -e l -K a d e r , to 
e s t a b l i s h  an Arab s ta te  that  would naturally be friendly to French plans 
for a Suez c a n a l .   ̂ The French government a l s o  had a sch e m e  to aid the 
dep ressed  c lo th  industry of Lyons with cheap Syrian s i l k ,  ^  and the 
French Algerian army considered Syria  an e x c e l l e n t  area  from which to 
procure h orses  .1 1  It was  not pure humanitarianism which motivated the 
French ,  but the British government,  while  recognizing F r a n c e 's  s e l f -  
in t e r e s t ,  b ased  its cooperat ion on F ra n c e 's  arguments for an a l t r u is t i c  
intervention to save  l iv e s  and property.
^Adolphus W .  Ward and George Peabody G o o ch ,  The Cambridge 
History of Brit ish Foreign P o l icy ,  1 7 8 3 - 1 9 1 9  (3 v o l s . ;  New York: 
M a cM il la n  C o .  , 192 3 ) ,  I I ,  4 5 1 .
^M ange,  Near Eas tern  Pol icy  of  Napoleon I I I , pp. 9 1 - 9 2 ; W il l iam  
M i l le r ,  The Ottoman Empire,  1 8 0 1 - 1 9 1 3  (Cambridge, England: The 
Universi ty  P r e s s , 1 9 1 3 ) ,  p.  3 0 1 .
^Marcel E m er i t , "L a  c r i s e  Syrienne et l ' e x p a n s io n  economique 
f ran ca is  en 1 8 6 0 , "  Revue Historique , CCVII (Avril-Juin),  1952) , 2 1 7 - 1 8 .
10I b i d . , P- 221
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Lord John R u s s e l l ,  the British foreign s e c r e ta r y ,  be l ieved  that  
Britain had to thwart the ambit ions of France by maintaining the 
in tegri ty  of the Ottoman empire.  D e s p i te  this d e s i r e ,  R u sse l l  
re lu c tan t ly  agreed to cooperate  in the e x p e d i t io n .  He cla imed that 
th is  cooperat ion was to p la c a te  the mid-Victorian d e s ire  to aid the 
Ottoman C h ris t ians  and to make it p o s s i b l e  for Britain to have a v o ice  
in any agreements that were made about the intervention and the future 
of S y r i a .
The m a s s a c r e s  had resu lted  from the fai lure of  Turkish reform in 
Syria  and the tradit ional an im osi ty  be tw e en  the nominally Roman 
C a th o l ic  Maronites  and the vaguely M oslem D r u s e s .  The Turks main­
ta ined a tenuous rule over the province ,  and the Brit ish government 
w as  trying to maintain Ottoman rule in the area by giving open support 
to the Ottoman reform movement.  The Hatt i-Humayun had in c r e a s e d  
M oslem  bigotry by its proclamation of  equal i ty  between C h r is t ia n s  and 
M oslem s . The new laws w e re  not ade q u ate  to overcome the tradit ional 
d i s l i k e  of  M oslem s for C h r is t ia n i ty .  The C h r is t ian s  had a lw ays  been 
s e c o n d  c l a s s  c i t i z e n s ,  and s o c i a l  change  of such magnitude w as  not 
to be tolerated by the I s la m ic  fa i th .  The bigotry, combined with the lack  
of ca p a b le  and s in c e r e  administrators , served to e m a scu la te  any genuine
reform within the Ottoman empire.
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The constant  shifting o f  the locat ion  of a l l  the Turkish admin­
is trators  resulted in incapable  rulers who had l i t t le  regard for honesty
■ r ' v . . ..... u ic i i . i i ,  to the needs oi  m e l o c a l
populat ion.  1  ̂ The Turks made no effort at maintaining personal security  
for the population, which was the core of  the "H at"  of 1856 .  In 
Lebanon,  there e x is te d  the common p ra c t ice  of a s s a s s i n a t i o n  among the 
Druses  and M a ro n i te s ,  but the Turks fa i led  to in v e st ig a te  the se v e n  
hundred murders in Lebanon from 1850 to 1 8 6 0 .1 3  Although reforms were 
decreed the complete  adminis trative machinery of  the two provinces 
remained corrupt,  b e c a u s e  a l l  the needs o f  an e f f i c ie n t  c iv i l  s e r v i c e  and 
d e s p o t ic  military adm inistration were s t i l l  lacking throughout the  r e g i o n . ^  
The British government w as  finding it  hard to continue to 
support the Ottoman empire . b e c a u s e  there  were ample reports that  the 
in c a p a c i ty  of the Turks extended even to cooperating in the s lau g h ter .  15 *I,
l^Ward and G o o c h ,  Cambridge History of British Foreign P o l i c y ,
I I ,  4 5 2 .
l^philip  K. H it t i ,  Lebanon in History (3rd e d . ;  New York: S t .  
Mart in 's  P r e s s ,  196 7) ,  p. 43 7 .
1 V 1 V . / 0  11*
The Impact of the Tanzimat on Polit 
P r e s s ,  1968) ,  p p . 6 1 - 6 5 .
r~ in Syria and P a l e s t i n e ,  1 8 4 0 - 1 8 6 1 :  
ics  and So c ie ty  (Oxford: Clarendon
^ Further Papers Relating to the D is tu rban ces  in Syria:  June I 8 6 0 ,  
in c losu re  no. 3 in no.  14, Paynter to M art in ,  July 5 ,  1360; in c losu re  
in no. 9 ,  Abela to Moore,  June 16, 1860; Papers Relating to the 
D is tu rban ce s  in Syria :  June 1 8 6 0 , in c losu re  in no. 19 ,  Moore to BuNver, 
June 2 3 ,  1860; in c lo su re  no. 2 in n o . 2 1 ,  Paynter to Mart in ,  June 2 5 ,  
1860 .
20
C le a r ly ,  t h e s e  m a s s a c r e s  presented an opportunity to g ive  aid to the 
vict im s of  Turkish misrule and perfidy. The British government a l s o  had 
to continue to prevent the Turkish empire from being partitioned by in te r ­
vention undertaken for the w e l fare  of the Ottoman empire.  If such  a p re c ­
edent was  ever s e t ,  the Ottoman empire would soon d is s o lv e  into anarchy 
as  the various groups of C h r is t ian s  revolted with the e x p e c ta t io n  of 
European a id .  The problem w as in tensi f ied  by the sentiment  for aid that 
was aroused in England.  Fear of  abusing t h e s e  fe e l in g s  of mid-Victorian 
humanitarianism was a primary considerat ion  of the Brit ish government.
The British c a b in e t  had ample warning about the fa ilure of Ottoman 
reform, and it was informed about the rumors forete l l ing a m a s s a c r e  of 
C h ris t ians  in Sy r ia .  C o n su l -G e n e ra l  Niven Moore, writing from Beirut 
in 1 8 58 ,  complained of insecure  roads,  a depressed commerce,  the 
inabil ity  to c o l l e c t  d e b t s ,  and the w e a k n e ss  and v en a l i ty  of the Ottoman 
e x e c u t iv e  a u th o r i ty . Other reports documented the mismanagement of 
the Ottoman authorit ies  , the l a c k  of j u s t i c e  in the courts  , and the 
"contem ptib le"  Turkish garrison throughout Sy r ia ,  P a l e s t i n e ,  and 
Le ban o n . ^
l^G reat  Britain, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers ,  LXIX 
(1860) ,  D e s p a tc h e s  from Her M a j e s t y ' s  C onsuls  in the Levant ,  Respect ing  
Past or Apprehended D is tu rb a n ce s  in Sy r ia ,  1858 to 1860 [hereafter  c ited 
a s  D e s p a tc h e s  from Her M a j e s t y ' s  C onsuls  in the Levant ,  Respect ing  
Past  or Apprehended D is tu rb a n ce s  in Syria ,  1858 to I 8 6 0 ] ,  no. 4 7 ,  Moore 
to Malmesbury,  September 14, 1 8 58 .
^7I b i d . , no. 2 1 ,  Finn to Malmesbury ,  May 2 6 ,  1 8 5 8 .
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In 1 8 5 8 ,  Consul James Finn of Je rsusa lem  Gbed a panic  among 
the Chris t ians  on the Mountain who had heard about the rumors of a 
general m a s s a c r e .  He further reported that  the number of robberies
and v — ’ s s in a t i  i s  night • tl„u. .sum and that perhaps t h e s e  rumors
did have some s u b s t a n c e . * ®
In October  of 1 8 5 9 ,  the re p re se n ta t iv e s  of  the European powers
presented a jo int  memorandum to the Turkish government,  complaining
about the dismal la ck  of progress  in applying the m easures  of  the charter
of reforms of 1 8 5 6 . * ®  Combined with th is  paralys is  of  reform were the
insecure  posit ion of  the e a s i l y  removable Ottoman o f f i c i a l s ;  the
provocation of the native C h r i s t ia n s ,  basking  in their new o f f i c i a l  equal i ty ;
the anim osity  fe lt  toward the ambitions of the powers;  and the M oslem s '
20anger and je a lo u s y  at  the Turks'  catering to the C h r is t ia n s .
Be s ide s  th ese  d i f f icu l t ie s  , the British government had to cope w*th 
the r ivalry that e x is te d  among the powers,  who were trying to explo it  
rel ig ious d i f fere n ce s  in order to gain econom ic  advantages  in Syria 
and Le ban on .^ *  The various n on -M oslem  s e c t s  ea ch  turned to one of the *I,
*®I b i d . , no. 6 6 ,  Finn to Malm esbury,  November 7 ,  1858 .
*®Bernard L e w is ,  The Emergence of Modern Turkey (2nd e d . ;  New 
York: Oxford Universi ty  Press  , 1968) ,  p.  119.
^ M a ' c z ,  Ottoman Reform in Syria and P a l e s t i n e , p. 2 3 5 .
2*Ward and G o o c h ,  Cambridge History of British Foreign P o l i c y ,
I I ,  4 5 2 .
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powers a s  both an economic  and pol i t ica l  patron. The Maronites  
looked toward the French who gladly supported them b e c a u s e  of a common 
C ath ol ic ism  and a tradition dat ing back to the c ru s a d e s .  The D ruses  
sought the support of the British , and the few Orthodox adherents tried 
to gain Russian protect ion.  Britain would not abandon the D r u s e s ,  bee  
they were her best  i n s t r u m b y  . . . :  lo gain an economic foothold in 
Bv- combat the penetration of the other powers.
In a vain  attempt to defeat  this unwanted ex te n s io n  of foreign influence,  
the Turks tried to maintain their  nominal rule over Lebanon by a l s o  encour­
aging s e c ta r ia n  c o n f l i c t s  from which neither side would emerge with any 
real s trength .  The Porte sought to cen tra l iz e  the administration and make 
it into a purely Ottoman rule.  22 This was to be accom plished by:
. . . keeping up a s t a t e  of fermentation to compel both 
the people and their c h ie fs  to a sk  for Turkish direct  ru le ,  
or ,  at l e a s t ;  to render it  im possib le  for the Le ban ese  to 
prosper under the nat ive administration granted to them 
by the e s ta b l i s h e d  sy stem  of government . 23
A genuine d e s ire  to improve government would have demanded some 
lo ca l  rule in a mountainous and s e c ta r ia n ly  divided area  such a s  Lebanon. 
Instead of  such a p o l i c y ,  the Turks were s a c r i f i c in g  the welfare  and 
tranquil ity of the people  of the Mountain to gain  their own s e l f i s h  
o b je c t i v e s  . 24
2 2 i b i d . , p. 452;  Hitti Lebanon in H i s t o r y , p. 4 3 3 .
2 ^D e s p a tc h e s  from Her M a je s t y ' s  C onsuls  in the Levant,  Respect ing  
Past  or Apprehended D is tu rb a n ce s  in Sy r ia ,  1858 to 1 8 6 0 , in c losu re  n o . l  
in no. 9 7 ,  Moore to Bulwer, June 30 1860 .
2 4j b i d . , inc losure  no. 1 in no. 74,  Moore to Bulwer, November 29 ,
1 8 58 .
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Although p o s s e s s in g  su f f ic ie n t  power in the area to suppress d is o rd ers ,  
the Turks were a c tu a l ly  fostering anarchy .  25 The Druses would 
probably defeat  the l e s s - w a r l i k e  Maronites  , and then the Turks , with 
the support of Europe, could e f fe c t  a devastat ing  punishment upon the 
Druses .
The maneuvers of  the Turks were s u c c e s s f u l  b e c a u s e  the Syrian 
c r i s i s  occurred at an e s p e c i a l l y  inopportune time in Anglo-French r e l a ­
tions . The British res p o n se  to the Syrian c r i s i s  was formed in an 
environment of su s p ic io n  and fear  of the French Emperor. N apoleon 's  
ambit ions and machinations in the unif icat ion  of I ta ly  had enhanc 
British su sp ic io n  of him. Palmerston d is l iked  Napole bargaining 
for Nice  and Savoy and his vague talk about the e x c e l l e n t  harbor at 
N ap les .  The race  between France  and Britain to build " i ro n c la d s "  and 
Napoleon's  announced desire  to remake the map of Europe were hardly 
conducive to a growth of  British confidence  in the Second Empire.
The Brit ish government was a l s o  concerned about a p o s s i b l e  F ra n c o -  
Russina rapprochement in which Napoleon would trade an advantage in 
the Near Eas t  for Russian  support for French moves on the Rhine. Lord 
Palmerston had been worried about such a p o s s ib i l i ty  s in c e  the Treaty *2
2 5 Ib id .  , inc losure  no. 1 in no. 114 ,  Moore to Bulwer, December 
31 , 1 8 5 9 .
2 ®Mange, Near Eastern P o l icy  of Napoleon I I I , pp. 8 3 - 8 8 .
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of Paris in 1856 .  Although the French never admitted i t ,  he bel ieved
that the integrity of  Turkey was no longer of great importance to
Napoleon. * 2  ̂ On March 15, 1 8 6 0 ,  Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russe l l
the foreign s e c r e ta r y ,  about the Emperor's Near East  policy:
There seem s good re a s o n  for thinking that Napoleon has 
great  sch em es  in his head for which he is trying to get 
the concurrence  and cooperation of Russia  and that the 
dismemberment of the Turkish Empire is the o b je c t  he wi l l  
next aim a t ,  afterwards the Rhine and perhaps Belgium, 
but a l l  in the most friendly manner and spir it  towards 
En g lan d . 2 ®
In April,  a fter  noting Louis Napoleon 's  tendency to present Europe 
with fa i te s  accom plis  , Palmerston wrote to Lord Cowley that " th e  
Emperor's mind seem s a s  full of schem es as  a warren is  full  of r a b b i t s ,  
and l ike  r a b b i t s ,  his schem es go to ground for the moment to avoid 
notice  of a n t a g o n i s m . 2  ̂ C lear ly  it would take  a strong motivating 
force  to make the Brit ish cooperate  in a French v io la t ion  of the integrity 
of the Ottoman empire.
R u s s e l l ' s  immediate re s p o n se  to the events  and this  threatened 
intervention was to urge the Porte to take strong measures to regain
? 7“ Werner E. M o s s e ,  The Rise  and Fal l  of  the Crimean S v s r e m , 
1 8 5 5 - 7 1 :  The Story of a Peace  Sett lement  (New York: S t .  M art in 's  
Press  , 19 6 3 ) ,  p . 2 .
2 ®Herbert C . F .  B e l l ,  Lord Palmerston ( 2 v o l s . ;  Hamden, C o n n . :  
Archon Books , 1966) ,  I I ,  2 5 0 .
9 q _
‘■ 'bvelyn  A shley ,  The Life and Correspondence of  Henry Tohn 
Temple, Viscount  P a ln ers to n :  1 8 4 6 - 1 8 6 5  ( 2 vols  . ;  London: Richard 
Bentley & Son,  1 8 7 6 ) ,  I I ,  182.
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control of  the area and to put an end to the a t r o c i t ie s  of the Druses .
He further warned the Turks that Great Britain would be forced to c o o p ­
erate in an a c t  of intervention if the m a s s a cre s  continued.  30 On July 23, 
in res p o n se  to Thouvenel 's  ca l l  for intervention,  R u s s e l l ,  af ter  much 
h e s i ta t i o n ,  agreed to the French prop o sa ls .  As r e a s o n s ,  he c i ted the 
frightful a ccou n ts  of the events  taking place  in D am ascus  and Lebanon 
and the Turkish role as inac t iv e  sp e c ta to rs  or a c c o m p l ic e s  in the 
s lau gh ter .  R usse l l  l inked his agreement  with a statement  that Britain 
was re luctant ly  agreeing to the pro jec t  and was a t taching cer ta in  c o n ­
dit ions to her cooperat ion .  R u sse l l  strongly urged that the French army 
not go into the interior of Syria and requested that the expedit ion be 
evacuated a s  soon a s  p o s s i b l e ,  perhaps within s ix  months. 31 R u s s e l l  
la ter  demanded that a protocol be signed by the powers and Turkey 
st ipulating that the occupat ion  be definitely limited to not more than s ix  
months,  barring unforeseen  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  Russe l l  be l ie v ed  that  th e se  
measures would s a t i s f y  the needs of  humanitarian sentiment  and e f f e c t  
a return to order within the Su l tan 's  domain. 32
R u sse l l  explained to Palmerston that he had agreed to the French 
intervention out of a " fe a r "  of European public  opinion and dip lomatic  3
3 0 co r r e s p o n d e n c e  Relating to the Affairs of Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 , Part I ,  
no.  2 ,  R u sse l l  to C o w ley ,  July 6 ,  1860; no. 4,  R usse l l  to Bulwer, July 
10 , 1860 .
3 T̂ b i d . , no. 2 2 ,  R u sse l l  to Cowley , July 23 , 1860 .
^ I b i d .  , no. 3 7 ,  Russe l l  to C ow ley ,  Ju ly 2 8 ,  1860 .
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co m p l ic a t io n s .  B e ca u se  of the in d e fe n s ib le  conduct o f  the Turkish 
government,  public  opinion would turn a g a in s t  the British government 
if  it refused to aid in the m is s io n .  France and Russia  would perhaps 
cooperate  in the expedit ion anyw ay,  and Britain would be dip lom atica l ly
O O
i so la te d  on the Eastern  Question and unable  to contain  French ambit ions . 
R u sse l l  c la imed that a pr incipal reaso n  for cooperation w as  the lam entable  
s ta te  of the vic t ims of Turkish misrule  and Moslem a t ro c i ty ,  No other 
course  of  a c t io n  appeared p o s s ib le  to R u s s e l l .  To o b je c t  to or prevent 
this a c t  of charity w as  to invite  the recrimination of  world and mid- 
Victorian opinion. The s i tuation  demanded a id ,  and th is  res p o n se  w as  the
most o b v io u s .  ^  Lord Palmerston agreed that  the d e s ire  tp/iimit French
/
ambition and to avoid arousing mid-Victorian humanitarian sympathy was
/  35
paramount in the d e c i s io n  to cooperate  with in tervention.
Fear  of humanitarian sentim ent  and d e s i r e  not to le t  France a c t
a lone overcam e the tradit ional Brit ish pol icy  of non-in tervention and
///
negated her government 's  re lu c ta n c e  to permit French troops to land in 
the Levant .  S i n c e  the m assap res  could spread beyond Syria  and into the 
r e s t  of the Ottoman empir^, it appeared to be an a c t  of chari ty  that  the 
powers come to the aid of the Ottoman C h r i s t ia n s .  R u sse l l  and the 
British government would not bear  the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  of obstruct ing  such  *3
^ M a n g e ,  Near Eastern  P o l icy  of Napoleon I I I , p. 8 8 .
3 ^Great B r i ta in , Parl iament ,  H ansard 's  Parliamentary D e b a te s  , 
3d s e r .  , Vol.  160 (1860) , pp. 1 5 - 1 6 .
35Bell ,  Lord Palmerston, II, 269.
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an obviously  humanitarian m is s io n .  The l im itat ions on F ra n c e ,  that  
were embodied in the protocol and convention ,  served British s e l f -  
in te re s t .  If the British government managed to get  Napoleon to agree  to 
s p e c i f i c  term s ,  R ussel l  had some leverage  to bargain with the French 
Emperor.
The Times agreed that  the expedit ion  had to be sent  to help the 
Ottoman C h r i s t ia n s .  On July 10, an editoria l declared that Britain would 
not be true to her nature if  she did not take  a c t io n  in res p o n se  to the 
m a s s a c r e s  in Lebanon. The writer bel ieved that the Turks were deeply  
implicated and that p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t i v e s  should not make the British 
government forget the w elfare  of human b e in g s .  36 On July 12, an 
editoria l came out strongly  for intervention and urged that British troops 
be in the vanguard of the exp e d i t io n .  The En g l ish ,  "who search  the earth 
through to find o b je c t s  for our philanthropy,"  should not fa i l  to respond 
to the cry of their  fe iiow C h r is t ian s  . 3 * 7
S in ce  Napoleon was  anxious to get  troops to Syria ,  only a protocol 
w as  to bo drawn up, but a formal convention was to be s igned shortly  
th e re a f te r .  On August 3 ,  1860 ,  the powers agreed to a protocol 
e s ta b l i s h in g  provis ions for twelve thousand troops to oe se n t  to S y r ia .  
France was to Provide the first  s i x  thousand men, and if  the second half  
was ever needed the powers were to meet and decide on the composit ion
^ The Times (London) , July 10 ,  1860 ,  p.  8 .
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■ ' I b i d . , July 12 ,  1 6 6 0 ,  p.  » .
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of the f o r c e .  The powers agreed that s ix  months might be adequate  for 
the o c cu p a t io n ,  but this l imitat ion could be ex tended.  Further,  the 
Porte was to bear the expenditure of  the expedit ion .  The powers a l s o  
arranged for an international committee to fix r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  for the 
m a s s a c r e s  , to determine the extent  of the guilt  of the l o c a l  Turkish 
adm inistrat ion ,  to de c id e  on an idemnity to the v ic t im s ,  and to su g g es t  
reforms for the new government of Lebanon.
The French forces  arrived in Lebanon on August 16 ,  1 8 6 0 ,  and a 
convention was signed on September 5 ,  1860 that  formally confirmed the 
measures of  the protocol.^®
W h ile  R u sse l l  engaged in promoting this convention among the 
powers ,  qu es t io n s  were ra ised in Parliament about the foreign s e c r e t a r y 's  
pol icy  in Syria and Bri ta in 's  support of the Ottoman empire.  Those  
speaking in favor of the government's  ac t io n  alw ays em phasized the 
charity and n e c e s s i t y  of the French intervention.  The expedit ion was 
intended to help the Ottoman C h r is t ian s  and was n e c e s s a r y  b e c a u s e  of 
Turkish w e a k n e s s  and i n e p tn e s s .  The p ra c t ica l i ty  of cooperat ion was 
recognized b e c a u s e  French ambit ions were to be limited , and Britain 
would have been ill advised  to o b struc t  a pol icy  agreed upon by R u ss ia  
and F r a n c e .
In ear ly  July ,  Lord Stratford de R e d c l i f fe ,  the former British 
am bassador  at Constantinople  and ardent proponent of the worth iness
M a n g e ,  Near Eastern  P ol icy  o f Napoleon I I I , p.  8 9 .
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and f e a s ib i l i ty  of the Turkish reform movement,  cited the importance of 
Syria to the Ottoman empire and exp ressed  doubt about the Turkish 
connivance  in the m a s s a cre s  . His major point was that Great Britain 
should try to s e e  that ju s t i c e  be done to a l l  the involved part ies  , 
part icularly  the Druses and the T u r k s . 3 " Lord W odehouse ,  who spoke 
for the government in the House of  Lords , admittpd the yuiit  of the Turks 
a nr. a s s e r te d  that the terrib le  condit ion of the Syr i tn  Chris t ians  demanded 
cons idera t ion .  W odehouse  explained that the intervention was n e c e s s i ­
ta ted ,  however,  by considerat ion  for the w elfare  of a l l  the C h r is t ian s  in 
the Ottoman empire.  If the m a s s a c r e s  spread to other Christ ian  groups,  
the Eastern Question would be decided by a l l  of the powers being forced 
to intervene and divide the empire in an effort to protect human l iv e s  .
To W ode h ou se ,  it did not appear that  this d iv is ion  could be accom plished  
without a confrontat ion, and eventual ly  w a r , among the p o w e r s . 4(3
On August 3 ,  Stratford again pointed out that u n less  Britain strongly- 
encouraged Turkish reform, c r i s e s  would continue to develop per iodica l ly  
in the Levant until  it becam e contrary to the b e s t  in teres ts  of the s u b je c t s  
of the Ottoman empire to maintain the moribund, but s t r a t e g ic ,  e m p i r e . * 401
3 ^Great Britain ,  Parliament,  Hansard 's  Parl iamentary D e b a t e s ,  3d 
s e r .  , V o l . 159 (1850) ,  p.  1651.
40 Ib id .  , pp. 1 6 5 3 - 5 4 .
41Great  Britain, Parliament,  Hansard 's  Parliamentary D e b a t e s , 3d 
s e r . ,  Vol.  160 (1860) ,  p p . 6 0 7 - 1 0 .
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Lord W odehouse agreed that Britain had to support Turkey. Judging from 
the present condit ion of Syria and the Mountain, W odehouse considered 
that  v igorous ,  immediate,  and e f fe c t iv e  ac t io n  had to be taken by the 
powers.  The s i tuation  demanded British cooperation; W odehouse f e l t ,  
however,  that the signing of the protocol was sufficient,  to protect  British 
and Ottoman i n t e r e s t s .  ^2
Lord G ran v i l le ,  the future Liberal foreign s e c r e ta r y ,  agreed that  the 
Ottoman empire had to be maintained b e c a u s e  it had de f in i te ly  helped to 
maintain the b a la n ce  of  power and thereby the peace  of  Europe.
Granvil le  be l ieved  that  the integri ty of the empire had to be vio lated  in 
this  in s t a n c e .  However,  the intrusion was only temporary, and w as  
n e c e s s a r y  if  Britain was to continue to support the Ottoman empire.  
Granvil le  considered the convention to be a means to limit French am bi­
t ions  and an opportunity for the Turks to strengthen their  hold on Syria  by 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  e f fec t in g  a return to law and order within that province .  
Furthermore, the English  public  would not permit a governmental po l icy  
of  support for Turkish rule if m a s s a cr e s  continued to o ccu r  within that 
empire.  Granvil le  descr ibed  intervention in Syria and support of  the 
Ottoman empire as  a c t s  of philanthropic numanitarianism and as being 
compatib le  with British in teres ts  in the Levant and on the C ontinent .
In the House of Commons , Sir James Ferguson,  member for Ayrshire,
4 2 l b i d . ,  p p . 6 1 9 - 2 0 .
4 3Ibid .  , p. 62 1.
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and Seymour F i tzg e ra ld ,  member for Horsham, ex p ressed  concern about 
French and Russian ambitions in the Levant .  They feared the se tt ing  of 
a precedent  for direct  intervention in the internal affa irs  of the Ottoman 
empire.  44 * R u sse l l  tried to mitigate  th e se  fears  by stat ing that  the 
Europeans had become involved in order to aid both the Turks and the 
Ottoman C h r is t ia n s .  The foreign s e cre ta ry  emphasized that there was no 
o f f i c ia l  provis ion in the protocol e s ta b l i s h in g  a precedent for future in te r ­
ventions . 46 47 The British government cooperated with in tervent ion  in th is  
in s t a n c e ,  but it had b een  motivated both by n e c e s s i t y  and by a human­
itar ian concern for the welfare  of the Ottoman C h ris t ians  .
John Bright,  a mid-Victor ian Radical who had denounced the effort 
expended in the Crimean W ar ,  a t ta ck e d  Britain 's  efforts to support and 
reform the Ottoman empire.  Bright be l ieved  that  it was an im p o ss ib le  
ta s k  to reform the Turkish s ta te  and that out of common s e n s e  and a 
genuine concern for the c i t iz e n s  of the Ottoman empire,  the British 
government had to quit this  h o p e le s s  t a s k . 46 Lord Palmerston responded 
to Bright’s c h a r g e s ,  declar ing that  a failure to support the  Turks was to 
invite  anarchy in the Levant  and a war of major p ro p o rt io n s .4 " Palmerston 
bel ieved that support for Ottoman reform involved temporary appall ing
44Ibid . , pp. G3 7 - 4 2  .
46 Ibid . , pp. 6 4 5 - 4 6 .
46Ibid .  , pp. 6 4 7 - 5  1 .
47
Ibid . , pp . 6 5 2 - 5 3  .
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s e tb a c k s  , but that a strong Turkish empire w a s  the b e s t  solution to the 
Eastern  Q u est io n .  It was  only the Turks who were c a p a b le  of ever being 
a b le  to rule s u c c e s s f u l l y  over such  a com posite  of p e o p le s .  Palmerston 
apparently  did not b e l i e v e  that the various C h r is t ian  groups could rule 
th e m s e lv e s  without a continuous development of  c r i s e s  as  the powers 
am bit ious ly  came to the aid of the ir  r e s p e c t iv e  p r o te g e e s .  The gov ern­
ment defended a s e l f - s e e k i n g  p o l icy  by emphasiz ing the good that it 
ev entual ly  would accom p lish  and sought to l ink this  p o l icy  with a concern  
for p e ace  and the val id ity  of an a c t  of char i ty .
The British government had cooperated with the French desire  to 
in tervene in the summer of  1860 ,  but by the fa l l  of 1 860 ,  the government 
began to attempt to get  the expedit ion out of  syria  and Lebanon.  After 
Fuad P a s h a ,  whom the Turks had s e n t  to r e - e s t a b l i s h  order,  had s u p ­
pre ssed  the m a s s a c r e s  and open warfars  by means of t e rro r is t ic  and 
punitive m easures  , the primary q u e s t io n  b ecam e the e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and 
value of the force that had been s e n t  by the p o w e r s . 48 The Convent ion 
of September 5 , 1860 had s e t  the length of the  occupat ion  a t  s ix  months , 
but this provis ion could be modified to allow a longer period of t im e.  
Br i ta in 's  o bserv ers  in Lebanon and Syria se n t  back  confl ic t ing  and varied 
reports on the value of the o ccu p a t io n .
48Fuad Pasha and Aali  Pasha were the two leading Turkish exponents  
of  Ottoman reform. Fuad 's  honesty  and integrity  were never questioned 
by the powers , and he w as  re s p e c te d  and feared by the people  of Turkey 
for his adm inistrative  and military a b i l i t i e s  .
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Lord Dufferin ,  the Brit ish rep re sen ta t iv e  on the jo int  com m iss ion  
se n t  by the powers to in v e s t ig a t e ,  viewed the  expedit ionary force as 
giving the Maronites  the opportunity for re ta l ia t ing  aga in s t  the Druses  
and as  prolonging the tension  and fr ic t ion  throughout Syria and 
Lebanon. ^  The Turks, w'ho under a l l  c i rcu m sta n ces  desired that the 
Europeans leav e  as  soon a s  p o s s i b l e ,  agreed with Dufferin ’s views .^0 
There was doubt that a continuation of  the French occupation was either 
n e c e s s a r y  or humanitarian,  but the fear  of a renewal of  the m a s s a c r e s  
kept the government from demanding an ev acuat ion  after s ix  months, 
a s  provided by the convention .
James Brant, the Brit ish consul at  D a m a s c u s ,  perhaps understood 
the s i tuation  more fully than Dufferin and firmly bel ieved in the need 
for a continued French o c c u p a t i o n . 5 1 Brant saw no real change in the 
Turkish adminis tration and sensed  a rebirth of  Moslem fa n a t i c i s m .  As 
soon as Fuad Pasha left  a particular  reg ion ,  that area degenerated into 
its previous s t a t e  of anarchy and corruption. The population was cowed 
but s t i l l  l ia b le  to a f a n a t i c a l  des ire  to m a s s a c r e  Chris t ians  . ^  if  Faud
ever went back to Constant inople  and the powers pulled out their 
expedit ionary fo rce ,  the m a s s a c r e s  could e a s i l y  be rep eated .  4
4 9Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of  Syria: 1 8 6 0 -6 1  , Part I , 
in c lo su re  in no.  155,  Dufferin to Fuad, September 29 ,  I 8 6 0 ;  no.  2 7 8 ,  
Dufferin to R u s s e l l ,  January 18, 1 8 6 0 .
5 Ql b i d . . no. 198, Aali  to Musurus , November 28. 1 8 6 0 .
0 Î b i d . , no. 145,  Brant to R u s s e l l , September 2 0 ,  1 8 6 0 .
5 ^I b i d . , in c losu re  in no. 156,  Brant to Bulwer, September 2 5 ,
1860;  no.  159 ,  Brant to R u s s e l l , O c t o b e r s ,  1860 .
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If France attempted to prolong the occu p at io n ,  the British cabinet  
was faced with a dilemma.  Its problem was how to fos ter  the appear­
ance  of a genuine humanitarian in teres t  m the s u b je c t s  of  the Ottoman 
empire,  and yet thwart any p o s s ib le  French intention to make the 
occupation into permanent French ru le .  Some Members of  Parliament 
were concerned le s t  the British government abandon Syria to Fran ce .  
Seymour Fitzgerald  and Sir James Ferguson considered the p o s s ib le  
ambitions of  France and R uss ia  to be gr ater threats  to British in te re s ts  
than any c o n s e q u e n ce s  from a renewal  of the m a s s a c r e s .  Both thought 
that Britain would bes t  s e rv e  the in te re s ts  of world p eace  and the 
w elfare  of the Ottoman C h ris t ians  by working to get the French out of 
Syria  and Lebanon. 53 Henry A. L ay ard , member for Southwark and a 
known Turkophile,  blamed the Maronites  for causing their own problem 
and suggested that  Britain protect  the D r u s e s ,  w-ho had a c te d  only to 
protect  th e m s e lv e s .  He noted that France had intervened to h e lp ,  but 
her continued p re sen ce  was damaging the authority of the Turks and 
giving the l o c a l  Chris t ians  an opportunity to carry out vendettas  .
Layard sought an immediate end to Brit ish sanct ion  of the venture .  5 4 
T h e se  a t tack s  on R u s s e l l ' s  pol icy  of cooperation were a c a l l  for an 
immediate effort by the government to push harder to get the French 
out of  Le ban o n .
s ^Great Britain ,  Parliament,  H ansard 's  Parliamentary D e b a t e s ,
3d s e x . , Voi.  161 (1R61) , pp. 10 94-1  105 .
5 4 ib id ,  , pp. 1 1 0 9 - 1 3 .
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After tes t ing  the British government's reac t ion  to a prolongation 
on severa l  o c c a s i o n s ,  T h o u v en e l , on January 11 ,  1851 ,  formally sought 
the British government’s atti tude on a continuance of the o c cu p a t io n .  
Thouvenel c la imed that Napoleon wanted to e v a c u a t e ,  but feared that 
m a s s a c r e s  would follow the aeparture of  the t r o o p s . 55 The French had 
no d e s ire  to prolong their s t a y ,  as  it was cost ing them a large amount 
of money; but,  if  they lef t  prematurely , their previous efforts would 
appear to have been w a ste d .   ̂6 Both Thouvenel and Prince Gorchkov, 
the Russian foreign m in is ter ,  ex p res sed  fear about the c o n s e q u e n ce s  of 
an e v acu at io n ,  b e c a u s e  they bel ieved that there was no strong centra l  
authority in Syria and that there was no secur i ty  or guarantee for the 
protection of the Ottoman C h r i s t i a n s .^ '7 If the ev acu at ion  resulted  in 
a renewal of the m a s s a c r e s ,  the powers would be r e s p o n s ib le ,  and 
Britain and France would have to answer  to an aroused pop ulace .
^ C o rre sp o n d e n ce  Relating to the Affairs of Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 , Part I, 
no. 2 3 2 ,  Cowley to R u s s e l l ,  January 11 ,  1861.
5 ^I b i d . , no. 2 6 7 ,  Cowley to R u s s e l l , January 2 8 ,  1 8 61 .
^' 'Great Britain ,  House of  Commons, Accounts and Papers , LXVIII 
(1 8 6 1 ) ,  Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of  Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 ,
Part II [hereafter  c i ted  as  Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of  
Syria :  1 8 6 0 - 1 8 6 1 ,  Part II ] ,  no. 30 ,  Cowley to R u s s e l l , May 2 , 1861;  
in c lo su re  no. 8 in no.  4 6 ,  Gorchakoff  to K is s e Je f f ,  May 2 ,  1 8 61 .
^^Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of  Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 ,  Part I, 
no. 134 ,  Cowley to R u s s e l l , September 2 1 ,  1360; no. 180,  Cowley to 
R u s s e l l ,  November 13 ,  1860;  no. 2 2 7 ,  Cowley to R u s s e l l , January 4 ,  
1 8 6 1 .
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Britain 's  primary o b je c t iv e  had been to limit the d i s a s te r s  as  much 
as  p o s s i b l e .  With regard to e x ten s io n  of the o ccu p at io n ,  Russe l l  
be l ieved  that intervention had been useful  at the beginning,  but it now 
had to be ended by February 5 , 1361 as  st ipula ted by the convention of 
September 5 . ^  The British government believed that the s ta t ioning  of 
ships -o f -w a r  and marines off the Syrian c o a s t  w as  adequate se cu r i ty  
a g a in s t  a renewal  of the m a s s a c r e s .  ^0 R ussel l  re s i s te d  French and 
Russian  p ressure ,  which he bel ieved was designed to enable  the French 
to s ta y  permanently,  by c i t in g  the la ck  of a genuine need and the pe ace fu l  
condit ion of the a r e a .  ̂* R u sse l l  pointed out to Thouvenel that any pro­
longation would be a provocation to the Moslems and a step toward a
French co lonia l  s t a t e . ^  The foreign s e cre ta ry  considered a prolongation 
to be a menace to British in te r e s ts  in the Mediterranean,  part icularly  the 
route to India,  and a precedent for further invas ions  undertaken as 
humanitarian aid to the Chris t ians  within  the empire.  ^3 R u s s e l l  warned 
the Turks that if  they wanted to fo r e s ta l l  any permanent foreign o c c u ­
pation,  they had to take a firm stand a g a in s t  any renewal of the m a s s a c r e s .  *I,
S^Great Br i ta in ,  Parliament,  Hansard 's  Parliamentary D e b a t e s , 3d 
s e r .  , Voi. 161 (1661) ,  p p . 1 1 1 4 - 2 2 .
^ Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 , Part I ,  
no. 2 5 4 ,  R u sse l l  to Cow ley ,  January 2 4 ,  1861; no. 3 1 2 ,  Cowley to 
R u s s e l l ,  February 19, 1861 .
6 l l b i d . , no. 172,  R u sse l l  to C o w ley ,  November 7 , 1 8 60 .
k^Ward and G ooch ,  Cambridge History of British Foreign P o l ic y ,
I I ,  4 5 5 .
"’Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of  Syria:  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 , Part II, 
no .  8 ,  Russel l  to Bulwer, April 8 ,  1 8 6 1 .
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He warned them that Europe held them r e s p o n s ib le  for any such  * 
m a s s a c r e s . ^
O b v io u s ly ,  Russe l l  did not re l ish  the prospect  of a prolongation, 
but he found it hard to demand that the French get out of Syria  b e c a u s e  
he had to avoid offending the humanitarian sentiment  of the mid-Victorians .
A renewal of  the m a s s a c r e s  result ing from British obstruct ion ism  and 
re fusa l  to permit a prolongation would be c o s t ly  to the cabinet  of Lord 
Palmerston and to the public  image of  Great  Britain both at home and 
abroad. Not until  March 7,  1 8 6 1 ,  did the French and British agree  on 
June 5 as  the day by which the ev acu at io n  was to be com pleted.  ^
Cowley warned Thouvenel,  however,  that Britain would not to le ra te  any 
more de lays  b ased  on F r a n c e 's  "patented  e x c u s e s . R e a s o n i n g  that 
Lebanon was not worth such a strong Brit ish animosity  and f in a n c ia l  
expenditure ,  the French decided to stop request ing a prolongation of the 
o ccu p a t io n .  The French completed the ev acu at ion  by June 10 ,  and the
r y
re s p o n s e  of the population of  Syria  and Lebanon was a b so lu te  indif ference .  64*
6 4 Ibid. , in c losu re  in n o . 15 ,  Fraser  to Dufferin , April 4 ,  1861; no. 
4 4 ,  Dufferin to R u s s e l l ,  May 11 ,  1861; no. 65 ,  Rogers to R u s s e l l ,  June 1,
1 8 6 1 .
^ C o r re sp o n d e n ce  Relating to the Affairs of Syria :  1 8 6 0 - 6 1 ,  Part I ,  
no. 3 3 5 ,  R u sse l l  to C ow ley ,  March 7,  1861; no. 3 3 7 ,  Cowley to Russel l ,  
March 7 , 1 8 6 1 .
6 ^I b i d . , no. 3 5 7 ,  Cowley to R u s s e l l , March 14 ,  1861.
^ Correspondence  Relating to the Affairs of S y r ia :__1 8 6 0 - 6 1 ,  Part II,
m c lo s u r c  no. 1 in no .  6 6 ,  F ra s er  to Bulwer, June 7 ,  1861; in c lo su re  no.
1 in n o . 72 , Fraser  to Bulw er, June 11, 1 8 61 .
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Previous to the e v a cu a t io n ,  the powers and Turkey had been  
trying to e s t a b l i s h  a new system of government for the whole of the 
province of Sy r ia ,  but the Turks managed to limit the d i s c u s s i o n s  to 
Lebanon a lo n e .  There was a new government in Lebanon when the 
ev acuat ion  was com pleted,  but it had been  agreed upon only after  long 
bargaining among the powers who were represented on the jo int  com m is­
s io n .  In the d e l ib era t io n s  of th is  com m iss ion ,  the Br i t ish ,  represented 
by Lord Dufferin , u su a l ly  cooperated with the Turks to de fea t  French 
proposals  to unite Lebanon under a Maronite ruler .  R u sse l l  d is l ik ed  
t h e s e  proposals  b e c a u s e  it was doubtful that the Druses  would be ju s t ly  
governed under such a s y s t e m ,  and a Maronite would probably follow 
the d ic t a t e s  of  the French government.  Instead  of th is  arrangement,  
F r a n c e ,  Britain , R u s s ia ,  P r u s s ia ,  Austria ,  and Turkey f inal ly  agreed that 
Lebanon be governed by a C h r is t ia n ,  who was  not a Maronite and who 
was appointee by the Turkish government.  This agreement further 
guaranteed that the rights of e a c h  minority were ¥o  be protected by 
giving them a v o ice  in an e f f e c t iv e  advisory counci l  and by redistr ibuting 
the various s e c t s  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y . 68 This sy s tem  worked; and,  after  the 
departure of the e x p e d i t io n ,  Lebanon en joyed a much improved a d m in is ­
tra t ion ,  while  Moslem r e s p e c t  for the Turkish government was not
6 8 M il le r ,  The Ottoman Empire,  p. 303 ;  M ange ,  The Near Eastern  
po l i c y  of  Napoleon I I I , p. 99; H it t i ,  Lebanon in H i s t o r y , p. 4 4 1 .  Fuad 
P a s h a ,  who presided over the meetings of  the co m m iss ion ,  e a s i l y  
dominated the weak French m in is te r .  Lord Dufferin and Fuad often 
combined to bend the com m iss ion  into aiding Ottoman and Brit ish 
i n t e r e s t s .
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destroyed by too much Ottoman de fere n ce  to the C hris t ian  pow ers .
The intervention su c ce e d e d  in aiding the nat ives of Lebanon by 
giving them good government and by restoring some order and tranquil ity  
to the re s t  of the province of S y r i a .
R u s s e l l  a l s o  fu lf i l led his g o a ls  of thwarting any p o s s ib le  French 
ambit ions and of s a t i s f y in g  mid-Victorian humanitarian se ntim ent .  The 
integri ty of the Ottoman empire had been temporarily v io la te d ,  but even 
the s trength of humanitarian se n t im en t ,  that  had made Russe l l  cooperate  
with the French ,  had not forced him to s a c r i f i c e  Br i ta in 's  tradit ional 
in te re s ts  and p o l i c y .  S e l f - i n t e r e s t  had d ic tated  cooperation in this 
particular  venture, and R u sse l l  s u c c e s s f u l l y  c loaked Francophobia  and 
the m aintenance  of British in te r e s ts  in the Levant with the aura o f  a
humanitarian concern  for the C h r is t ian  and Moslem s u b je c t s  of the Porte.
CHAPTER III
The Cretan Rebel l ion and Refugee Removal 
Five years after  the c o n c lu s io n  of the Syrian intervention and a 
year after  the death of Lord Palm erston,  a revolt occurred on C rete  that 
renewed the European powers'  in teres t  in the problems of the Levant .
The Porte 's  s u b je c t s  on the is land  of Crete  had been  e s p e c i a l l y  wait ing 
for genuine Ottoman reform s i n c e  the "H at"  of 1856 .  The Cretan C h r i s ­
t ians desired reunion with G r e e c e ,  with which they had strong e thnic  
t i e s .  In 1830 ,  after  the Greek war for independence ,  the Protocol of 
London separated the Cretans from G r e e c e ,  which was  allowed to le a v e  
the Ottoman empire.  B e s id e s  th is  d e s ire  for reunif icat ion  and the Porte 's  
failure to implement the reforms of  the Hatt i-Humayun of 1856 ,  the 
Cretans complained of ex tor t ionate  and irregular ta x a t io n ,  unequal t r e a t ­
ment of C h ris t ians  and M o s le m s ,  and denia l  of ju s t i c e  in the c o u r t s .  1 
In addition to t h e s e  com pla in ts ,  antagonism between the Chris t ian
^J. A. R. Marriott ,  The Eastern  Q u es t io n ,  an H is to r ica l  Study in 
European Diplomacy (4th e d .;  Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s ,  1940) ,  p.  3 7 6 .
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majority and the Moslem minority was strong.  Another co n f l ic t  e x is te d  
between the small landlord c l a s s  , who controlled the fer t i le  p la in s ,  
and the res t  of the population, who were left  with h i l l s id e  p lo ts ,  or 
with nothing at a 11.  ̂ As was the usual c a s e  in the Ottoman empire,  
it was not a mere matter of Moslem oppression  and Christ ian  suffer ing .  
Rather,  it was the ruling c l a s s ,  which contained numerous C h r i s t ia n s ,  
explo it ing those  under it s  contro l .
The problems of Crete  occurred within the context  of  a waning 
British in te re s t  in perpetuating the  employment of the Ottoman empire 
as  a b lock  to the expansion  of the other powers .  The o p p re ss iv e  system  
of government that the Turks permitted to e x i s t  on the is land of Crete  
contributed to this doubt.  The tradit ional pol icy  of supporting the 
Turks had become open to doubt,  b e c a u s e  it was wel l  known that " th e  
cruelty  and corruption of the regime were tempered only by incompetence.  
Lord S ta n le y ,  a foreign s e cre ta ry  during the c r i s i s ,  professed "n e i th er  
sympathy nor s p e c ia l  in te re s t  for the T u rk s , "  and admitted that 
his only concern was who was to rep lace  the Turks in the L e v a n t . * 5
^Leften S .  Stavrianos , The Balkans S in ce  145 3 (New York: Holt ,  
Rinehart ,  and W in s to n ,  1958) ,  p.  4 7 0 .
5 R o d e r i c H .  D a v iso n ,  Reform in the Ottoman Empire,  1 8 5 6 - 1 8 7 6  
(Princeton, N . J . :  Princeton U niversi ty  Press  , 1968) ,  pp. 1 5 8 - 6 1 .
^Robert B lake ,  D i s r e a l i . (Garden C i ty ,  N . Y . :  Doubleday & C o .  , 
1967) , p . 550 .
5 Harold W . V .  Temperley and Lil lian M. Penson,  Foundations of 
Brit ish Foreign Policy from Pitt to Sa l isbury  (Cambridge, England: 
U niversi ty  Press  , 1 9 3 8 ) ,  p.  3 0 6 .
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Lord Lyons , a shrewd and experienced d ip lo m at , observed that in
1866 there was not much feel ing in England in favor of the Ottoman
s t a t e .  8 On March 2 4 ,  1866 ,  Lord Clarendon,  the other foreign se cre tary
during the Cretan c r i s i s  , wrote:
. . . old Turkish proc l iv i t ies  were rapidly e v a n e s c in g  as 
people know more about the united ignorance and stupidity 
o f  the Mahomedans who squat  in some of the fa i r e s t  regions 
of the world in order to prevent their  being productive.  ^
Brit ish p o l i t ic ians  were beginning to l o s e  faith in the p o s s ib i l i ty  
of genuine Ottoman reform. Without  reform the Turkish s t a t e  could not,  
and should not ,  continue to e x i s t .  Stanley h im self  had lo s t  fai th in the 
future of the Ottoman empire by 1 8 6 4 ,  and his  attitude did not change" 
when he took o f f ice  in 1 8 6 6 .8  Although s k e p t ic ism  about the value of 
Turkey was  in its embryonic s t a g e s  and limited to only a few people  in 
government,  British foreign s e c r e ta r i e s  had to be more c i rcu m sp ec t  in 
their support of the empire.  It s t i l l  appeared to be e s s e n t i a l  to 
Britain 's  in te re s ts  to su s ta in  the Ottoman empire,  but Brit ish p o l i t i c ia n s  
were beginning to respond to a gradually changing public  opin ion.  S i n c e  
the government was charged with c a l l o u s n e s s  about the condit ion of the 
s u b je c t s  of the Ottoman empire,  it  became good policy to make Near
°Lyons to C ow ley ,  June 6 ,  1 8 6 6 ,  as  quoted in Richard Mil lm an,  
British Foreign P o l icy  and the Coming of the F ra n c o -P ru ss ia n  War 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press  , 1965 ) ,  p. 2 9 .
~Werner E . M o s s e ,  The Rise and Fall  of  the Crimean S y s te m ,  1 8 5 5 -  
71:  The Story of a P e a c e  Se t t lem ent  (New York: S t .  M art in 's  P r e s s ,
1963) , p.  4 .
8 Kenneth Bourne, "G rea t  Britain and the Cretan Revolt ,  1 8 6 6 - 6 9 , "  
S lavonic  and Eastern European R e v ie w , XXXV (October,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  7 5 .
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Eastern policy appear to be humanitarian.
The tradit ional pol icy  of non-in tervent ion  was reinforced by this  
discouragement over the lack of Turkish reform. When the other powers 
sought to aid the C re ta n s ,  S ta n le y ,  who be l ieved  that s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
dic tated n on- in tervent ion ,  tried to make non-intervention appear more 
humanitarian than intervention.  It  was good strategy to make pol icy  
appeal to mid-Victor ian sympathy and to show that pol icy  was des igned 
to give genuine aid to the v ic t im s .
On September 2 ,  1 8 6 6 ,  in re s p o n s e  to the empty promises of the 
Turks and to the P o r te 's  threats o f  an Egyptian control led administration 
for the i s la n d ,  the Cretan General  Assem bly ,  an i l le g a l  rep re sen ta t iv e  
group which had been meeting at Sphakia s i n c e  May,  declared the 
i s la n d 's  independence from the Ottoman empire and its union with 
G r e e c e .^  The rebe l l io n  had grown from a movement str iv ing for reform 
into a n a t io n a l i s t i c  attempt at a formal reunion with G r e e c e .  In 1858 and 
1864 ,  Turkish promises had p lacated  the C r e t a n s ,  but by 1866 nothing 
excep t  union with G r e e c e  was going to s a t i s f y  them. The Greek govern­
ment,  a lw ays intent on gaining more territory,  wi l l ingly  acce p te d  patron­
age  of the re b e l l io n ,  and on August 14,  1 8 66 ,  ca l led  for foreign in te r ­
vention to aid the Cretans . ^
“ Marriott ,  The Eastern  Q u e s t i o n , p. 3 7 6 .
' “'Matthew S.  Anderson,  The Eastern Q u est ion ,  1 7 7 4 - 1 9 2 3 :  A 
S tudy in In ternat ional  Relations (New York: S t .  Mai Lin's P r e s s ,  I n c . ,  
1966) . p. 159 .
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The British government based it s  res p o n se  to this proposal on 
se v e ra l  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  In regard to C re te ,  the British government 
had to consider  the welfare  of the large Turkish minority under a Greek 
Cretan government,  the example that  such a dismemberment would se t  
for other minority groups in the Ottoman empire,  and the terrible 
f in an c ia l  and p ol i t ica l  condition of the Greek s t a t e .  The British were 
more concerned about the Suez C an a l  and the route to India that would 
be endangered, if the Ottoman empire d is so lv e d  into an a rch y .  Although 
the route was not d irec t ly  threatened by a Cretan  separat ion from the 
Porte 's  domain, the maintenance of  a viable  Ottoman empire was s t i l l  
central to British in te re s ts  in the Near E a s t .  Fear of Russian  expansion  
in the Levant was a def in i te  factor  in the formation of British policy 
b eca u s e  the Russians were p o s s ib le  patrons o f  both the is land of C rete  
and the Greek kingdom.
The Cretan re b e l l io n  became a diplomatic  i s s u e  during a c r i t i c a l  
period of  British dom est ic  p o l i t i c s  . It was contemporary with the p ass in g  
of  the Reform Bill of 1867 and the e le c t io n s  that  followed i t .  Be s ides  
concern over p o l i t ica l  reform, Englishmen were worried about the v io le n c e  
of  Feruanism, the f in a n c ia l  r e c e s s io n ,  and the formation of the Canadian 
c o n s t i tu t io n .  P o l i t i c ia n s  ch ose  not to make an is s u e  out of non­
intervention or continued British support of the Ottoman empire b e c a u s e  
a s p e c i f i c  foreign po l icy  could hurt a p o l i t i c a l  party, both in the e l e c t i o n  
and after taking o f f i c e .  There w as  a l s o  a genera l  lack  of in teres t  in
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England about foreign a f f a i r s .  Diplomatic  pol icy  was considered a
"matter  of t a s te "  and, therefore ,  of l i t t le  real  importance to o n e 's
11l i f e .
Lord Clarendon,  the British foreign se cre tary  in the Liberal 
government of Lord John R u s s e l l ,  maintained an o f f ic ia l  att itude of 
non-intervention throughout the spring of 1866 .  The British govern­
ment refused to a c c e p t  any Cretan petit ions  for aid and urged 
co n c i l i a t io n  upon the Porte .  Lord S ta n le y ,  the son of the new Prime 
M in is te r ,  took o f f i c e  on July 5 ,  1866 as foreign se cre tary  in Lord 
Derby 's  C onservat ive  governm ent . A. J .  P.  Taylor has character ized  
Stanley  as  " th e  most i s o l a t i o n a l i s t  foreign s e cre ta ry  that Great Britain 
has ever know n."  ^  Lord Clarendon gives us a further idea of S ta n le y 's  
thinking: S tan ley  had " s t r a n g e  theories  about our being only a manu­
facturing nation" and that Great Britain had "no  b u s in e ss  to meddle 
with foreign a f f a i r s .  S ta n le y ,  react ing to the noisy threats  of in te r ­
vention of the previous adminis trations of Lord Palmerston and Lord John 
R u s s e l l ,  s ta ted  that he w as  "not  a supporter of  the sy s tem  of  advis ing
^ M i l l m a n ,  British Foreign P o l i c y , d . 2 2 3 .
^“A . J . P .  Taylor,  The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1 8 4 8 - 1 9 1 3  
(Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s ,  1954) ,  p.  2 33.
^ A s  quoted in M il lm an,  British Foreign P o l i c y , p. 3 0 .
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foreign g ov ernm ents . "  He thought that this right had been  abused by
14Palmerston and R usse l l  and that Br i ta 'n 's  prest ige  had suffered.
Lord S ta n le y ,  whose ideas were much in the favor of the middle c l a s s ,  
was reserved by nature ,  adverse  to taking extreme m e a s u re s ,  and c o n -  
tantly  aware of the d i f f icu l t ie s  of any course of  a c t io n .  C on se q u e n t ly ,  
he was anxious to avoid rais ing any fundamental i s s u e s  , and he made a 
virtue out of  the n e c e s s i t y  of being in a c t iv e .  ^  The tendency to follow 
the  tradit ional policy of non-in tervention was in crease d  by S ta n le y 's  
personal i ty  and b e l ie f s  .
S tan ley  considered the reported Ottoman a t ro c i t ie s  on Crete a s  
d is tort ions  and s ta ted  that "ev e ry  kind of exaggerat ion and calumny" 
was being used by the part isans  of Cretan unif icat ion  with G ree ce  to 
d iscredit  the Turkish g o v e r n m e n t . ^  In g e n e r a l ,  he was a g a in s t  a 
continuation of Ottoman rule on the is la n d ,  but the condit ion of G r e e c e
and the mixed population of Crete  were a l s o  factors  to be considered
1 7in the Cretan  problem . x 14*7
14Temperley and Penson ,  Foundations of British Foreign Po l icy ,
p. 306 .
^ B o u r n e ,  "G re a t  Britain and the Cretan R ev olt , "  p.  75 .
* ° G r e a t  Britain, House of Commons,  Accounts and Papers , LXXIV 
(1867) ,  Correspondence Respect ing the D i s turbances  in C rete :  1 8 6 6 -  
67 [hereafter  c ited as  Correspondence  Respect ing  the D is tu rb a n ce s  in 
Crete:  1 8 6 6 - 6 7 1, no .  3 6 ,  S tanley to Lyons,  September 4 ,  18 66.
i 7 S tan le y  to G la d s to n e ,  September 3 ,  1 8 6 6 ,  quoted in Mil lman,  
British Foreign P o l i c y , p . 58 .
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In the ear l ie r  s ta g e s  of the r e b e l l io n ,  S ta n le y 's  foreign pol icy
attempted to urge co n c i l ia t io n  upon the Porte in its suppress ion  of the
rebel l ion  and advised the Turks to avoid arousing European sympathies
for the rebe l l io us  Cretan C h ris t ians  . S tanley wrote to Lord Lyons , the
ambassador  at Constantinople :
I have to in struct  you to inform Aali Pasha that Her 
M a j e s t y ' s  government strongly a d v is e s  the Porte to 
deal  with the Cretans with utmost forebearance  and 
in a conci l ia tory  spir it  to redress  any g r ie v an ces  
of which they may have c a u s e  to compla in .  In the 
present s ta te  of  the Continent it would be a great  
misfortune to Turkey if any quest ion  were to a r i s e  
which should e x c i te  the sympathies of Europe in 
favor of the Chris t ian  s u b je c t s  of the P o r t e . 1®
This course  of a c t io n  would soothe  mid-Victorian feeling for the Cretans
and help S tan ley  keep the other powers from intervening to aid the
C re ta n s .  S ta n le y ,  a great  procrast inator ,  was perfect ly  will ing to le t
the Cretan affa ir  re s o lv e  i t s e l f  without involving the other  major European
powers and British p o l i t i c s .
Later,  as the rebe l l io n  becam e more bloody and the powers showed 
more c o n ce rn ,  Lord Stan ley  made it c le a r  to Lord Lyons what he be l ieved  
to be the proper course  for the Turks . He made it equal ly  as  c le a r  that
^ S t a n l e y  to Lyons ,  August 13 ,  1866 ,  I b i d . ,  p. 5 7 .  Europe 
was in the p ro cess  of recovering from the A ustro-Prussian  war. Britain 
was watching the formation of the North German Confederation and 
N apoleon 's  d e s ire  for compensat ion on the Rhine.
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G reat  Britain was r.ot going to force su ch  a course  on the Porte .
He said:
The Porte can d e v is e  no surer method of  allaying fe e l in g s
of this  de scr ip t ion  [sympathy] than that of c lem ency  ------
towards the vanq uish ed ,  and the promise of an equitab le  
and mild adminis tration for the time to come; and, without 
press ing  the point beyond what a friendly and a l l ied  
government may fa ir ly  do your E x c e l le n c y  wil l  in c u lc a te  
this  course  on the Turkish ministers  whenever a favourable  
opportunity offers for your so doing. ^
Lord Lyons had reported e ar l ie r  that he had rece iv ed  " p o s i t iv e
a s s u r a n c e s "  that  Mustapha P a s h a ,  the new Ottoman governor for
C r e t e ,  had " in s t ru c t io n s  to a c t  with k indness  and forbearance  towards
the Chris t ians  in C re te ,  and to make every p o s s ib le  effort to restore
order in the is land  without having re c o u rse  to f o r c e .
The British am bassadors  at Paris and Constantinople  were ordered 
to maintain a " c a r e fu l  n e u t r a l i ty , "  as  it  would se rv e  no o n e 's  in te r e s t ,  
e x c e p t  R u s s i a ' s ,  to s e e  ch aos  in the Near E a s t .  21 The British govern­
ment attempted to prove to the British people the good intentions of 
the Porte .  Any real  d i s c u s s i o n  of the e v i l s  of Ottoman rule and the 
ju s t n e s s  of the Cretan g r ie v a n ce s  was s tudiously  beclouded by grand 
de c la ra t io n s  of  British good intentions .
The condit ion of the Greek s t a t e  aided S t a n le y ' s  d e fe n s e  of non-
^^Correspondence Respect ing  the D is tu rb an ce s  in C rete :  1 8 6 6 -  
6 7 , no. 8 9 ,  S tan le y  to Lyons ,  November 2 ,  1 8 6 6 .
2^1 bid . , no. 5 0 ,  Lyons to D i c k s o n ,  September 7,  1 8 6 6 .
2 l l b i d . , no.  4 7 ,  S ta n le y  to C o w le y ,  September 18, 1866;  no. 5 0 ,  
S ta n le y  to Ly ons ,  September 2 2 ,  1 8 66 .
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in tervent ion .  S ince  the Cretans had openly sought union with G r e e c e ,  
a contrast  of  the government of the Ottoman empire with the government 
of the kingdom of G ree ce  was s ig n i f i c a n t  in the British d e c i s io n  to refrain 
from intervention. In other words,  Great Britain would not rea l ly  be 
aiding the Cretans by helping them gain unif icat ion  with G r e e c e .  Stanley,  
and the others  who were in favor of s t r ic t  non-in tervent ion ,  made ample 
u s e  of the mismanagement and misgovernment of the Greek kingdom. 
Cretan union with G re e ce  was portrayed as  a p o s s ib le  d i s a s t e r  for the 
Cretan  p e o p l e .
The Greeks had encouraged reunion by engaging in d ire c t  aid s in c e
th e  proclamation of Cretan unity with G r e e c e .  Tney had se n t  hundreds
of  v o lu n te e r s , adequate munitions , and enough army o f f ice rs  to lead
the r e b e l s .  ^2 The British government rea l ized that  the Cretan rebe l l io n
would not end until Greek aid was ended.  2 2 S ta n le y ,  who wanted the
rebel l io n  to end, viewed intervention by anyone as  harmful to the w elfare
of the people of the Levant ,  b e c a u s e  it  was " a  matter of humanity" to
discourage  aid to the r e b e l s .  Greek aid deluded the Cretans into
2 4be l iev ing  that some great  power would intervene on their b e h a l f .
“ - I b i d . , no. 74 ,  Erskine to S ta n le y ,  October  1 1, 1866 .
 ̂^I b i d , , no. 120 ,  Lyons to S t a n le y ,  November 2 8 ,  1 8 6 6 .
2 ^Ibid . , no.  118,  Di c ks on  to Stanley , November 17,  1866 .
S i n c e  rebel l ion  was fu t i le ,  foreign aid would only prolong the suffering
9 c
of the Cretan people .  ' Lord Stanley  thought that G reece  w as  "bankrupt,  
a n a r c h ic a l ,  without an honest  p o l i t i c ia n  or a c l a s s  which can  be trusted 
with p o w er ." 2 6  He even wrote to the British ambassador at Athens ,  Lord 
E rs k in e ,  that the motives for G r e e c e ' s  aid were s e l f i s h  and u n re a l i s t i c  
s i n c e  G ree ce  had encouraged futi le  warfare ,  which served only  to 
"protract  the m iser ies  of the inhabitants  and the deso la t ion  of  the 
country ."^  Lord Lyons wrote to S tan le y  on December 19, 1866 to 
expla in  the des ire  of G r e e ce  to protract the s truggle .  " G r e e c e  is bent 
upon m i s c h i e f , "  wrote the am bassador  "and the qu es t ion ,  whether we 
are  or not to have an Eastern Quest ion  forced upon us in the spring 
depends upon whether or not G re e ce  can be kept in order. " 2 8
The 3r i t ish  consul at Athens,  Lord Erskine ,  doubted that  the 
Cretans would en joy any better  government under the Greeks than under 
the Turks.  2 9 If the British aided Crete  in her q u e s t  for unity with 
G r e e c e ,  Britain would then become res p o n s ib le  for Greek rule  on the
^“i b i d , , no. 66 ,  S tan ley  to L y o n s , October 12,  1866 .
-°As quoted in Mil lm an,  British Foreign P o l i c y , p. 5 9 .
O 7
°  ' Correspondence Respect ing the D is turbances  m C re te :  1866 —
67., no. 124 ,  Stanley to Ersk in e ,  December 11, 1866.
2 '^Thomas W odehouse Legh Newton, Second Baron, Lord Lyons ,
(2 v o l s . ;  London: E.  Arnold, 1913) ,  I ,  15 9 - 6 0 .
2 9Correspondence  Respect ing the D is turbances  in C re te :  1 8 6 6 -  
6 7 ,  no. 2 5 ,  Erskine to S ta n le y ,  August 8 ,  1 8 6 6 .
i s l a n d .  The Ionian Is lands was a c o n cre te  exam p le ,  often c i ted  by 
the  defenders of non-in tervent ion ,  of what the G reeks  could do to the 
adminis tration of a newly acquired a r e a .  From a well  administered 
terr i tory ,  the Ionian Is ands were treated as a conquered country and as 
" f i e f s  of the poli t ic ians at  Athens. " 3 0  Stanley and his supporters  often 
pointed out another consideration:  if G'-eek government mistreated the 
Ionian  G ree k s , th e  large minority of Moslems on Crete  could not ex p e ct  
to be treated w e l l  under this  same Greek Christ ian  government.
The general  condit ici  of the whole  Greek kingdom was obviously  
not much better  than the Turkish administration on C re te .  Many Greeks 
le f t  the impoverished Greek s ta te  for the Ottoman empire,  b e c a u s e  it 
w as  general ly  known that a Chris t ian v i l lag e  in the Ottoman empire was 
more prosperous than a s im i lar  one in G r e e c e . 3 1 Most of the problem 
in G ree ce  was based on G ' e e c e ' s  im p e r ia l i s t ic  ambit ion to regain  all  
the land where Greeks we e predominant.  The Times noted that  the 
G reeks  should tend to in ternal  matters before attempting to expand their  
boundaries . 32 The im pressions and d e scr ip t ion s  of  G ree ce  served as 
e x c e l l e n t  gr is t  for S ta n le y 's  propaganda mill to defend his p o l icy  of 
n o n - in te r v e n t io n .
3 0w i i l iam  M il le r ,  fhe Ottoman Empire , 1 8 0 1 - 1 913 (Cambridge, 
England: The U niverse  y Press  , 1913) ,  p.  303 .  The British government 
had taken over the Ion-an Is land s  during the Napoleonic  vVars and in 
1862 ceded them to t h - n e w  Greek ki ng,  both as  a gesture  of  good wil l  
and as  a bribe for his refraining from caus ing  problems in the Near East.
3 ■'•Stavrianos , T i e  Balkans S in ce  1 4 5 3 , p.  2 96 .
32Tne Times (L /ndon), October  2 0 ,  1866 ,  p.  8 .
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Lord S t a n l e y ' s  main o b je c t i v e  on the dip lomatic  front w a s  to keep 
Russia  and France from act ing  together ,  s in c e  the ir  jo int  a c t io n  w as  the 
only  real  threat to keeping the Cretan rebel l ion  a problem among the 
G r e e k s ,  C r e ta n s ,  and Turks.  S ta n le y ,  and most Englishmen,  s t i l l  
be l ieved  that Russia  wanted to destroy the Ottoman empire and s e iz e  
control of the S tra i ts  . It w as  further bel ieved that  France might 
cooperate  with the R u ss ia n s  in the E a s t ,  and the Russians  might then 
support the French a g a in s t  su sp e cte d  future German intentions . ^  
Napoleon III and Tsar Alexander II had d is c u s s e d  such  a p o l icy  in 
September of 1 8 5 9 ,  but the d i f fere n ce s  between the two nat ions were 
too great  to e n a b le  them to c o o p era te .  Napoleon was not ready to give 
Alexander a free  hand to expand in the Levant or to overturn com ple te ly  
the terms of the Treaty of P a r i s .  The Tsar  would not support France 
on the R h i n e . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  in the la te  1 8 6 0 ' s ,  this  fa i lure  to 
cooperate  was  not o b v io u s ,  and the image of F ra n c o -R u s s ia n  co o p er ­
a t io n  haunted European c h a n c e l l e r ie s  .
In the e a r l i e s t  s ta g e s  of  the rev olt ,  Thouvenel displayed l i t t le  
in teres t  in d irec t  a c t i o n ,  remarking only  that France  be l ieved  that  
"good government was d e s i r a b le  whether in C re te  or G r e e c e . "  35 At
■^Miiiman, British Foreign P o l i c y , p.  62 .
^ B e n e d i c t  H. Sumner, "Th e  S e c re t  F r a n c o -R u s s ia n  Treaty of 
3 March 1 8 5 9 , "  English  H is to r ica l  R e v ie w , XLVIII (January, 1 9 3 3 ) ,  8 1 .
•^Correspondence  Respect ing  the D is tu rb a n ce s  in Crete :  1 8 6 6 -  6 7 ,  
no.  31 ,  Cowley to S ta n le y ,  August 2 8 ,  1866.
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f i rs :  the R ussians  hoped that the ambassadors  at C on stan t in op le  would 
a c t  togetner to force c o n c e s s io n s  from the Porte.  S tanley d e fea te d  this 
proposal  to make the Turks give m by se ek in g  to de lay  any threats  by 
the powers until  after the a c t io n s  of the new Ottoman commiss ioner  on 
C re te  could be a s c e r t a i n e d . ^  Stanley  further c la im ed that it was the 
P o r te 's  duty to put the re b e l l io n  down by armed f o r c e ,  s in c e  the rebe l l io n  
sought the separat ion  of C re te  from the Ottoman empire.
Russia  was not prepared in 1867 for a major commitment in the Near 
E a s t .  D esp ite  a strong d e s i re  to overturn the terms of the Treaty of 
P a r i s ,  part icularly  the neutra l izat ion of  the Black S e a ,  she needed the 
cooperation of another power to counter Britain's strong support of the 
t re a ty .  Russian  f in an ces  were as  bad a s  ever ,  whi le  her southern r a i l ­
roads were not yet com pleted.  Along with peasant  unrest ,  sh e  was 
involved in exp an s io n  into Central Asia and with Pol ish  revolts  . 
N e v e r th e le s s ,  the Russians  a s  protectors of Slavs and the Orthodox 
Church, had to maintain their  image as a defender of  the C h r is t ian s  within  
the Ottoman empire.  This protection could not be allowed to becom e the 
res p o n s ib i l i ty  of  lo ca l  r i v a l s ,  such as  G reece  or Romania, or the  great 
pow ers ,  Austria or Fran ce .  ^7 Prince Gorchakov,  R u s s ia ' s  foreign 
m in is te r ,  attempted to maintain a c o n s e r v a t iv e ,  but vocal  p o l ic y .
^ I b i a . , no. 3 6 ,  S tan ley  to Lyons,  September 4 ,  1866.
3 7Bourne, "G re a t  Britain and the Cretan  R e v o l t , "  p. 78; Benedict  
H. Sumner. " Ignatyev at C o n s t a n t in o p le , 1864-  1 8 7 4 , "  P a r t i ,
S la v o n ic  and E a s t European R e v ie w , XI (January, 1933) ,  347 .
He threatened the Turks and cautioned the G r e e k s . ^8 Gorchakov was 
anxious to cooperate with France and Bri ta in ,  but a l s o  sought to keep the 
problem ai ive  until  an opportunity arose  to force a revocat ion  of the 
neutral izat ion of the Black S e a .
Although the British government remained formally committed to a 
pol icy  of s t r i c t  non-in tervent ion ,  one of its rep resentat ives  in the Near 
East  decided to depart from this policy in December of 1866.  C . H .  
D ic k s o n ,  the veteran British consul  on C re te ,  gave orders to Commander 
Pym,  a British naval captain  who was cruis ing near C re te ,  that he could 
a c c e p t  Cretan refugees  on his craft  and convey them to G r e e c e ,  if they 
so d e s ire d .  40 The British commander soon used his  d iscre t io n  and 
removed two hundred refugees  from C r e te ,  transporting them to G r e e c e .  
Rus s i a ,  F ra n ce ,  P ru s s ia ,  Austr ia ,  and the United S ta tes  immediately 
a llowed their naval commanders to follow Pym's exam ple .  The e f fec t  
of this  removal was a s e r v ic e  to the re b e ls  and contrary to British 
p o l ic y .  D ick so n  rece iv ed  a mild reprimand from his  government,  but 
The Times approved of the a c t io n  as  one done in the s e r v ic e  of humanity 
and c o n s is te n t  with the duty o f  a good Englishman. 41
3 8 Correspondence Respect ing the D is tu rban ce s  in Crete :  1 8 6 6 - 6 7  , 
LXXIV (1867) ,  no. 5 6 ,  Gould to S ta n le y ,  September 22 ,  1865; no. 151,  
Buchanan to S t a n le y ,  December 2 5 ,  1866 .
^ S u m n e r ,  " Ignatyev at C o n s t a n t in o p le ," P a r t i ,  p.  347;  Newton, 
Lord L y o n s , I ,  166.
a r\
HC o r r e s p o n d e n c e  Respect ing  the D is tu rb an ce s  in Crete:  1 8 6 6 - 6 7 , 
in c lo su re  no. 4 in no. 143,  D ickson  to Pym,  December 8 ,  1 8 6 6 .
4 ^The Times (London),  December  2 4 ,  1866,  p.  8.
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Refugee removal offered the British government an e x c e l l e n t  
opportunity to take  an outwardly humanitarian course  of a c t io n .  To 
ev a cu a te  th ese  poor re fu g e e s ,  who were fleeing the barbarous Turkish 
irregulars , would be doing them a s e r v ic e  by removing them from, a 
s i tuat ion  in which they had l i t t l e  hope of improvement.  Be s id e s  this 
" g o o d , "  however,  there a l s o  ex is ted  the " e v i l "  of demonstrating 
sympathy for the rebel l ion  which might lead other s u b je c t s  of the Porte 
to revolt  and s e e k  outside aid a g a in s t  the Turks. Refugee removal a lso  
s e t  an example of  intervention for the other powers . Open sympathy and 
aid were a c t io n s  that a b so lu te ly  had to be avoided in the Near East;  
thus the British government repudiated Pym's act ion and continued its 
po l icy  of s t r ic t  n on- in tervent ion .
S t .  Vincent Lloyd, the British consul  at Syra, G r e e c e ' s  major port, 
warned Stanley that  the Greeks regarded any a c t io n ,  such as  refugee 
rem oval ,  as a def in i te  show of  sympathy for the reb e l l io us  Cretan  
C h r is t ia n s .  Lloyd a lso  re la ted  how he expla ined Pym's act ion  to the 
G r e e k s .  It w as  to be understood as "pure ly  and simply a spontaneous 
a c t  o f  philanthropy" by an indiv idual . ^2 Neither the Greeks nor the 
Cretans bel ieved him,  and both continued in their e x p e cta t io n s  of 
further British a i d .
In March of 186 7 , The Times correspondent at Athens , obviously
4 ?Correspondence Respect ing the D is tu r c a n ce s  in Crete:  1 8 6 6 - 6 7 , 
no.  133,  Lloyd to S t a n l e y , December 15 , 1866.
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in sympathy with the government 's  disapproval  of the removal,  
emphasized the danger of a pol icy  of intervention.  If the British 
ac ted  on any pre te xt ,  the other powers would soon imitate them and 
attempt to outbid England to gain " the ir  potential e n d s . " ^
The British government built  its c a s e  on the future c o n s e q u e n ce s  of 
any a c t i o n s ,  and therefore had to s a c r i f i c e  the sm al ler  good of  refugee 
removal for the greater  good of  containing the c o n f l i c t .  The humani-  
tar ianism of such a c t s  as  r e f u j e e  removal was i l lu so ry ,  as their  
u lt im ate  resu lts  were contrary to the welfare  of the rece iv ers  . Mid-  
Victorian humanitarianism demanded an intervention to re l ieve  the 
suffer ings  c-f the C r e ta n s ,  but S tanley  and his  supporters counteracted 
this  des ire  by turning humanitarianism into a reason for non - in terven t ion .  
They were not about to let their  fe e l in g s  subvert their  chief  o b j e c t i v e s - -  
the maintenance  o f  the b a la n ce  of power and the protection o f  British 
in te r e s ts  in the Near Ea s t .  They wished to accom plish  this by protecting 
the integrity of  the Ottoman empire,  out a t  the same time by following 
the tradit ional p o l icy  of non - in terven t ion .
On February 15, 1867 ,  the major d i s c u s s io n  of Britain 's  p o l icy  of 
non-in tervent ion  and refugee removal took place in the House of  Commons. 
W .  H. Gregory,  a Liberal representing Dublin and a known p h i lh e l le n e ,  
did not l imit his  su g g e s t io n s  to C re te ,  but brought up the whole  Eastern 
Q u e s t io n .  He considered Brit ish support of the Ottoman empire to be 43
43 The Times (London) , March 14, 1867 ,  p.  12.
" i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  m is tak en ,  and u n w is e . "  Gregory c la imed that the 
traditional  policy was wrong in every r e s p e c t ,  and that it had fa i led  
m iserably  in its two principal o b je c t i v e s .  The Ottoman empire had not 
rea l ly  contained Russian expansion  and the Turkish government had uuu 
reformed i t s e l f .  The Ottoman empire was doomed d e sp i te  Brit ish aid,  
and a l l  that the British government was accom plish ing  was prolonging 
the agony of its c o l l a p s e .  Chris t ian  control of the Levant was obviously  
the wave of the future. Assuming that Christ ian  control meant bet ter  
government,  the British were blocking the posit ive  progress of  the 
C h ris t ian  s u b je c t s  of the Porte .  Furthermore, the Brit ish government was 
hyp ocr i t ica l  and in c o n s i s t e n t  in its support of revolutions that  supposedly 
aimed at freedom and exp u ls ion  of foreign rule .  Where it had been 
advantageous to support rev o lu t io n s ,  as  in South America and I ta ly ,
Great  Britain had b een  ardent in her support of the r e b e l s .  W h en  the 
benef i ts  for England were nebulous or n o n - e x i s t e n t ,  as  in the Levant ,  the 
Brit ish government was either  lacking in in teres t  or in league with the 
o p p re ss iv e  Turks. Regretting that Crete  had been le f t  in the Ottoman 
empire in 1830 and discounting  the condition of the Ionians , Gregory 
requested that Britain aid the Cretans and any other s u b je c t  people  of 
Turkey that asked for help .  The British government had to end its 
obstruct ionism  to the progress  of the Ottoman C h ris t ians  and help 
educate  these  people  so that they might form good governments after 
le a v in '  Turkish m isru le .  In regard to the Cretan rev o l t ,  Gregory mini­
mized the role of Athens in the insurrect ion and c i te d  the amount of
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Turkish misgovernment and cruel r e p re s s io n .  The Cretan g r ie v a n ce s  of 
unfair ta xa t io n ,  i n ju s t i c e ,  poor educat ional  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and inadequate  
transportation were considered to be leg i t im a te .  The Cretans were 
se ek in g  better  government,  which they hoped to r e c e iv e  from the  G r e e k s .44 456
Gregory hoped that  the British government,  while  working for an eventual 
separat ion  of Crete  from the Ottoman empire,  now would do i ts  duty and 
aid in the removal of refugees  . 4 ® Gregory 's  sp e ech  was a s c a ld in g  
a t ta c k  on Bri ta in 's  Levantine policy and an inquiry into the wisdom of 
S ta n le y 's  po l icy  of n o n - in te r v e n t io n .4 ®
Gregory was unusual in the House of  Commons in his o b je c t io n s  to 
n on- in tervent ion ,  and as he was not a prominent member his a t ta c k  by 
i t s e l f  should not be given too much s i g n i f i c a n c e .  However,  it is  worthy 
of note b e c a u s e  it exempli fied a humanitarian a t ta ck  on the government 's  
a l le g e d  numanitarian pol icy  of  non-in tervent ion .  Gregory w as  appealing 
to mid-Victorian sympathy for th ese  suffering people .  If the government 
did not give an adequate  d e ie n s e  of its p o l icy ,  then non-in tervent ion  
in the  Cretan re b e l l io n  would become a r e a l  i s s u e .
Henry A. L a y a rd , a man of forceful personal i ty  and the e x c a v a to r  of 
Nineveh,  approved the government's  pol icy  of n o n- in tervent ion ,  although 
it appeared u n fee l in g .  He considered the s u c c e s s  c f  the Cretans improb­
ab le  and British aid in the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire e x c e e d in g ly
4 4Great Britain ,  Parl iament ,  H ansard 's  Parliamentary D e b a t e s ,
3d s e r .  , V o l . 185 (1867) , p p . 4 1 2 - 1 3 .
45I b i d . , p .  4 1 6 .
46I_bid. , pp. 4 0 6 - 2 1 .
u n w ise .  Any aid t.o the insurgents  only ra ised  f a l s e  hopes and caused 
more bloodsned and d e struc t io n .  ' Immediate " f e e l in g s  of humanity" 
had to be suppressed  in favor of a r e a l i s t i c  policy and the general  
w elfare  of a l l  the involved p a r t i e s . 48 Layard sugg ested  that Greek 
imperial ambit ions  were a c tu a l ly  hurting the Chris t ians  within the 
Ottoman empire by making reform more d i f f icu l t .  48 After c iting G r e e c e ' s  
mismanagement of the Ionian Is lands , Layard suggested  that foreign 
in tervention,  u n le ss  it was overwhelming,  would quick ly  c a u s e  the Turks 
to revoke many of the improvements that had been gained by the s u b je c t s  
of  the P o r te . 88 He bel ieved  Brit ish support of the Ottoman empire,  or 
at l e a s t  non-in tervent ion ,  to be the correct  pol icy .
W il l iam  Ewart G la d s to n e ,  a lready a prominent L ibera l ,  s trongly  
supported non - in te rv en t ion .  D eclar ing that p ra c t ica l i ty  must overcome 
immediate fe e i in g s  of sympathy,  Gladstone espoused S ta n le y 's  p o l ic y .  
Coming from som eone who,  as  a humanitarian ard h igh-church p o l i t i ­
c i a n ,  was c a p a b le  of arousing a large amount of r ighteous indignation 
about governmental  p o l icy ,  G la d s to n e 's  support of non-in tervent ion  was 
a r e a l  aid to S t a n l e y .
With regard to Gregory's  charge of  wanton cruelty in the Turkish 
su p p re ss io n ,  S tan le y  s tated that some cruelty was only natural among
4 7 I b k L  ,. P - 4 2 6
4 8 I b i d . ,. P- 4 2 5  .
4 9 I b i d  . , PP . 4 2 8 - 3 0
8 8 I b i d . ,■ P . 4 3 9 .
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such  barbarous people .  Tne Turks were s in c e r e ly  attempting to mini­
mize the suffering of the pe ace fu l  Cretan populat ion. 5 1 Although 
s t r i c t  non-in tervent ion ,  the course  Britain had to t a k e ,  was caus ing  
him some qualms of c o n s c i e n c e ,  S tanley  claimed that  non-intervention 
was the only course  open to the government.  To intervene in any manner 
would ca u s e  " t e n  times as  much s u f f e r i n g H e  said that if  Crete  were 
given autonomy, the whole structure of the Ottoman empire would d i s s o lv e  
into n a t io n a l i s t i c  revolutions . The Eastern  Quest ion would be opened, 
and Stanley was re luctant  even to contemplate  the results  of th a t .
In March of 1 8 67 ,  a debate  occurred in the House of Lords, 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  about the removal of refugees  from war-torn C re te .  The 
Duke of Argyll , a Turkophobe, re la ted  that  he was not opposed to the 
government's genera l  plan of non-in tervent ion ,  but that he was concerned 
about the re fusa l  of Her M a j e s t y ' s  government to aid in the removal of 
r e f u g e e s .  He bel ieved  that non-intervention was a c c e p t a b l e ,  "provided 
the u s e  of  force  did not degenerate  into mere brutal i ty ,  and that  the 
recognized customs of war were o b s e r v e d . "53  The Duke d is l ik e d  the 
u se  of Albanian m ercenaries  and Cretan Moslem ir regulars .  In its use  of 
such troops , the Porte was showing l i t t le  regard for the welfare  of  the *523
5 ^ b i d .  , p.  4 4 7 .
52 Ibid. , pp. 4 4 7 - 4 8  .
53 Ibid . , p . 152^
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Cretan populat ion.  In Argyll' opinion, D ic k s o n 's  instruct ions  to aid 
in the re! >val of refugees  hau been "worthy of the h ighest  honours and 
a fine demonstration of moral c o u r a g e . "  5 4 xhe c i rcu m stan ces  o f  each  
s i tuat io n  had to be taken into ro n s id e r a t io n , and, at the very l e a s t ,  the 
government had to make its orders to British rep resentat ives  more explic i t .  
Argyll suggested  that  the Brit ish had been  "far  more Turkish than the 
government at C onstant inople"  in their s t r i c t  adherence  to non-in tervent ion  
and that  for the s a k e  of the Cretan re fug ees  the British had to a id  in their  
r e m o v a l . 50 T h e se  h e lp le s s  refugees  were starving and being m assacre d  
by Moslem irregulars .  It was Bri ta in 's  duty to come to their a i d ,  other­
w is e  Britain was shirking its moral obl igat ion to prevent b loodshed and 
to aid a deprived and powerless  people .
Argyll presented humanitarian and a l t ru is t i c  r e a s o n s  for removal of 
the Cretan refugees  , but he was a lso  being sh orts ig hted .  He w a s  making 
no provis ion for the care of the refugees once  they got to G r e e c e ,  and 
Argyll further fa i led to reco g n iz e  that if Britain removed the re fu g e e s  she 
was re s p o n s ib le  for theii condit ion under their new rulers .
Responding to Argyll 's  a l le g a t io n s  , Lord Derby took the pos i t ion  that 
even such infringements of neutrali ty a s  removal of refugees  served  only 
to encourage revolt  in the Levant and would lead to " th e  immediate and 
bloody renewal  of  the whole Eastern Q u e s t io n . "
c 4
qIb id . , P. 1522
5 5 Ibid. , P. 1523
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W hile  non-in tervent ion  was de bate d ,  the Cretan rebe l l io n  expanded, 
d e s p i te  S ta n le y 's  efforts , from an affa ir  of the Ottoman empire into a 
c r i s i s  of European im portance.  On January 24 ,  1 8 6 7 ,  the Marquis  de 
M ou st ier ,  the French foreign minis ter ,  told Julian F a n e ,  the Brit ish 
charge d 'a f fa i re s  at P ar is ,  that Crete was  the "n u c le u s  of gangrene"  that 
might poison the whole Ottoman empire.  He su gg ested  that C re te  be 
given lo c a l  autonomy and eventual ly  be added to G r e e c e ,  which was to 
be expanded to include al l  its e thnic  t e r r i t o r y . T h e  Russians  gave 
l i t t le  support to this  proposal b e c a u s e  they  did not want a strong and 
exoanded Greek s ta te  to r e p la c e  Turkey in the Levant .  Lord S ta n le y  told 
Earl Cowley that only if su p press ion  appeared im p o s s ib le ,  w h ich  it did 
not,  would England support su ch  a proposal b e c a u s e  the Porte would 
have to be forced to agree to a se parat ion  of C re te .  57 S tanley  would 
not go to war to  force  the Porte into a c t io n  b e c a u s e  he rea l ized  that  it 
would require a military encounter  result ing  in a m a s s iv e  Turkish defeat  
as  at  N a v a n n o .5 8  it  was not a ch ar i tab le  a c t  to s laughter  a n a t io n 's  
army and navy to force  her to fu lf il l  another n at ion 's  d e s i r e s ,  ev e n  though
5t>Great Brita in , House o f  Commons , Accounts and Papers . LXXIII 
( 1 8 6 7 - 6 8 ) ,  Further Correspondence Respect ing  the D is tu rb a n ce s  in 
Crete:  186/ [hereafter  c i ted a s  Further Correspondence  R esp ect ing  the 
D is turbances  in C rete :  1867] n o . 5 , Fane to S t a n le y ,  January 2 4 ,  186 7.
 ̂ Î b i d . , no. 56 , S tan ley  to C o w le y , March 2 7 ,  1 8 67 .
5 8M illm an,  British Foreign P o l i c y , p. 61;  Further Correspondence 
Respect ing  the D is tu rb a n ce s  in Crete:  1 8 6 7 , no. 8 5 ,  Lyons to S ta n le y ,  
March 2 9 ,  1867 .
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t h e s e  d e s ire s  might be in the b e s t  in teres ts  of  some of  that government 's  
s u b je c t s  .
S t a n le y ' s  own policy  of urging reform and r e c o n c i l ia t io n  upon the
Ottoman government was floundering. S in ce  it could blame its fa ilure on
the other  powers ,  the government was not reluctant  to expla in  away its
ack  of s u c c e s s  in this endeavor.  Lord Lyons expla ined:
I can do nothing with the Turks about C re te ,  b e c a u s e  they 
mistrust  the in tentions of F ra n c e .  The R ussian  Ambassador 
te l l s  them plainly that  Russia  is determined that  Crete  s h a l l  
be annexed to G r e e ce  and d e c la re s  that Fran ce  has given 
R uss ia  a s s u r a n c e s  that  the o b je c t  of a l l  the s te p s  tak en  by 
France is  to p la c e  the Porte in a posit ion in which it cannot  
e s c a p e  from t h i s . ^
In March of 1 8 6 7 ,  the French and Russians  su g g ested  a p l e b i s c i t e  
on C r e te ,  but S ta n le y  promptly turned this proposal  down for he knew 
the: im plicat ions  of  such a s t e p . ^ '  Many other s u b je c t  peoples of  the 
Ot oman empir e would demand such  a course of ac t ion  and the empire 
wc aid s o c n  d is in te g r a te .  S ta n le y  f inally  re luctantly  agreed to cooperate
wi :h the French government in urging s p e c i f i c  and limited reforms on the 
Pc r te .  These  reforms , which he bel ieved  would be b e n e f i c i a l  to the s u b -
) (  c ts  of  the Porte ,  included mili tary and naval reforms , econom ic  improve 
n ents , better  t ransportat ion sy s tem s , and improved ed ucat iona l  f a c i l i t i e s
S 9^ J Lyons to C o w le y ,  June 19, 1867 ,  as  quoted in M il lm an,  Bri t ish  
Foreign P o l i c y , p . 98 .
b^Further Correspondence  Respect ing the D is tu rb a n ce s  in C r e t e : 
1867 , no .  4 5 ,  S ta n le y  to C o w le y ,  March 13 ,  1867.
Bourne, " G r e a t  Britain and the Cretan R e v o l t , "  p. 82 .61
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Although having l i t t le  faith in the abi l i ty  of the Tub;s and the C h r is t ian s  
ever to live  together in harmony, Stanley urged cooperation on t h e s e  r e ­
form measures b e c a u s e  he wanted to limit F ra n co -R u ss ia n  c o o p e r a t io n . * 62 *
The T sa r 's  government did not agree  to the program b e c a u s e  it would 
strengthen the Ottoman empire.
By April of 1 8 6 7 ,  the French ,  trying to cooperate with R u ss ia ,  pro­
posed c e s s a t i o n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  and a jo int  commission of inquiry into the 
Cretan g r i e v a n c e s . 62 Again Stan ley  refused to back this  proposal ,  th e r e ­
by removing the " te e th "  of the id e a .  The Porte had learned that any such 
demands could be met with impunity, if Britain did not a ls^  make the 
re q u e s t .  After the Turks refused to fulfi l l  the su g g es t io n s  of the powers,  
Stanley and Lyons agreed that  the Turks ac ted  w i s e ly  and were a c tu a l ly  
following the British government 's  d e s i r e s .  If  the Turks manifested 
h e s i ta t io n  and w e a k n e ss  in the f a c e  of a n a t io n a l i s t i c  rev olt ,  they only 
encouraged further bloodshed within the Ottoman empire,  A q u ic k ,  mild 
suppress ion  was the most humane course  of a c t i o n . 64 S tanley when he 
defeated the proposals of France and R u s s ia ,  demonstrated a concern for 
Turkey and all  its s u b j e c t s .
In the summer of 1 8 67 ,  when the Turks began a reign of terror to 
crush the r e b e l l io n ,  they stopped following S ta n le y 's  a d v ice  that they
62Ib id . , p. 8 4 - 8 5  .
62Purther Correspondence Respect ing the D is tu rban ce s  in C r e t e :
18 6 7 , no. 9P , Cowley to S t a n l e y , April 19,  1 8 6 7 .
° Îbid . , n o . 2 1 2 ,  Lyons to S t a n l e y , July 11 , 1867 .
mildly suppress the rev olt .  They employed large numbers of Turkish 
ir regulars ,  well  known for their brutality., and made it a policy to s tarve  
out the rebe l s .  65 Such a t ro c i t ie s  brought the weight  of European public  
opinion to bear on their r e s p e c t iv e  governments .  S ta n le y 's  policy of 
non-intervention was threatened by a oarrage of humanitarian o b je c t io n s .  
The Turks claimed that c o n c e s s i o n s  to the C hris t ians  would be a s ig n  of 
w e a k n e s s  to the Ottoman Moslems and a stimulus to other  C h ris t ians  to 
rev o lt .  S tanley  was c l o s e  to despair  for the continuation of non­
intervention,  both b e c a u s e  of the in ca p a c i ty  and cruelty of the Turks and 
the growing pressure from France and R u s s ia .  If th ese  problems c o n t in ­
ued, S tanley  bel ieved  that the is land  was lo s t  to Turkey. 66
Although Stanley limited the intervention of the powers to refugee 
removal,  there was s t i l l  doubt in Britain that the government should not 
aid in this endeavor.  The Duke of Argyll continued,  in 1 8 6 8 ,  to m a in ­
ta in  his in teres t  in the condit ions on C re te .  After disavowing any 
intentions of a t tacking S ta n le y 's  b a s i c  i d e a s ,  h e  commented in the House 
of Lords on S ta n le y 's  fa i lure  to aid in the removal of Cretan refugees  , 
an ac t io n  in which a l l  of the powers were then engaged.  Having 
ex p re s se d  doubt that condit ions would improve on the is la n d ,  Argyll d e ­
clared chat Stanley was merely allowing matters to take their  own c o u r s e .
65|bid_. , no. 172,  D ick s o n  to S t a n l e y , June 3,  1867 .
66]3ourne, "G rea t  Britain and the Cretan R ev olt , "  p. 8 7 .
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Reqretting the further barbarit ies  perpetrated by the Albanians and the 
Turkish irregulars , Argyll noted that the a t r o c i t ie s  cer ta in ly  must be of 
great extent  b e c a u s e  even D i c k s c n ,  " a  good friend of T urk ey ,"  reported 
their common occu rren ce  .  ̂^
The Earl of Malmesbury,  who had some experience  a t  the Foreign 
O f f ic e ,  ra ised  the point that th o se  refugees  who had b een  removed to 
G ree ce  were seek ing  a return to C r e t e .  Malmesbury be l ieved  that " th is  
showed that  in flying from their country they had not bettered their  c o n ­
dit ions ."® ® Earl R u sse l l  s a r c a s t i c a l l y  commented that a few Cretans 
were now starving in G re e ce  instead of l iving in Crete.®®
After this l a s t  d e b a te ,  S tan ley  concluded that his pol icy  re f le c te d  the 
opinion of parl iament .  He wrote to Lyons that " the debate  of Friday l a s t  
showed great indif ference on the Cretan quest ion  and that  " th e  general  
wish  appeared to be to continue to keep us as  much out of  the quarrel as 
p o s s i b l e ."
By January of 1 8 68 ,  there developed among the powers who had trans­
ported re fugees  to G re e ce  more of a concern about the condit ions of the
6 7
'G r e a t  Britain ,  Parliament,  Hansard 's  Parl iamentary D e b a t e s , 3d 
s e r .  , Vol.  191 (1868) ,  pp. 8 0 6 -1  1.
6 8lbid_. , p . 8 1 7 .
6 9Ibid . , p.  817
^ S t a n l e y  to Lyons ,  April 2 8 ,  1 8 6 8 ,  as  quoted in Mil lman,  Brit ish 
Foreign P o l i c y , p . 111.
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Cretans in G ree ce  than about those remaining on C re te .  The condit ions  
in the refugee camps were abom inable ,  and many children were dying of 
s ta r v a t io n .  ̂* Many of th e se  refugees  desired to return to C re te ,  but the 
Greek government would not permit their departure.  S t a n le y ' s  concern 
about the results  of their  removal from Crete had been proven valid , b e ­
c a u s e  the Greeks were as  incompetent as  the P-i t ish  had pictured them to 
b e .  S ta n le y 's  policy of non-in tervention was proved to be the more 
humanitarian course of ac t io n ;  the removal of  refugees  was  obviously  not 
an aid to the suffering Cretans .
In April of 1868 , Moustier  attempted to get  Stanley to cooperate  in 
a note protesting the G ree k 's  treatment of the r e f u g e e s ,  and to aid in their 
return to C r e t e .  S tan le y  protested their treatment ,  but refused to aid in 
their  removal.  In September,  1868 ,  when the condit ions of the re fug ees  
were even w o rse ,  S tanley  s t i l l  refused to become involved.  He s ta ted  
that if Britain removed the refugees  from G r e e c e ,  Britain would be 
res p o n s ib le  if  the Cretans were mistreated on C r e te .  S tan le y  su c ce e d e d  
in stopping French in tervent ion ,  but at the c o s t  of suffering by the 
Cretan r e f u g e e s ,  whose  privations  were made the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of 
G r e e c e .  By transferr ing the burden of  guilt  to the Greeks , S tan le y  made
' xGreat  Britain, House of Commons,  Accounts  and Papers , LXXIII 
(1 8 6 7 - 6 8 ) ,  Correspondence R espect ing  the D is tu rban ce s  in Crete  f h e r e -  
after  cued  as  Correspondence Respect ing  the D is tu rb an ce s  in C re te ] , 
no. 5 4 ,  Erskine to S t a n le y ,  January 2 9 ,  1868 .
^-Bourne,  "G re a t  Britain and the Cretan R e v o l t , "  p.  8 9 .
~°Ibid . , p . 90 .
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refugee removal and Cretan union with the Greek s ta te  much l e s s  
a t t ra c t iv e .  Non-intervention appeared al l  the more humanitarian.
Lord Stan ley  s u c c e s s f u l l y  made his policy of not aiding in refugee 
removal a c c e p ta b le  to the m id -V ic to r ia n s . The removal of refugees  w as  
s u p e r f ic ia l ly  humanitarian, but its ultimate re s u l t  was proved to be of 
no s e rv ice  to the C re ta n s .  The government a l s o  claimed that its pol icy  
w a s  aimed a t  keeping the peace ;  the price that w as  being paid for p e a ce  
and for British in teres ts  was obscured by pious rhetor ic .  S tanley  was 
determined to fulfil l  his o b je c t iv e s  by giving h is  ac t io ns  a glow of b e n e v ­
o l e n c e  and hum anitar ianism . By doing th i s ,  he could only strengthen his 
c a s e  in the mind of-a mid-Victor ian .
Stanley did take some posit ive  measures in the Near East.,  but th ey  
se em  to have been more for public consumption than anything e l s e .  As a 
g e s tu re  toward reco n c i l in g  the powers and the Cretans , he urged the 
Porte to appoint a C hris t ian  governor who was resp ec ted  by the Cretans/^ 
By urging such an aopoincment,  S tan le y  was trying to appear humanitarian, 
and at the sam e time aid his  own c a u s e .  A C hris t ian  governor would prob­
a b ly  r e c o n c i le  a large number of Cretans to Ottoman rule and p o s s ib ly  
g iv e  them good government with more autonomy within ‘he Turkish empire.  
The appointment would a l s o  conveniently  strengthen that em pire 's  hold 
on the is land and undercut some of the powers'  concern over the treatment
74 Correspondence Respect ing  the D is tu rban ces  in C r e t e , n o . 3 3 ,  
S ta n le y  to E l l i o t t , January 1 1, 1868 .
of the Cretan C h r is t ian s  . The French approved of  the sugg est ion ,^5  
but the lurks continued their s ta l l in g  t a c t i c s  and the appointment was 
never m ad e .
Although the Turks refused to l i s t e n  to the su g g es t io n s  of al l  o u t ­
s i d e r s ,  they did public ize  some reforms and promises for C r e t e .  In 
December of 1 8 6 7 ,  for exam ple ,  the Porte offered the Cretans exemption 
from taxes  for a certa in  .umber of  years  , monetary aid to rebuild destroyed 
h o u s e s ,  tax r e v is io n ,  abo l i t ion  of the exemption from the mil itary t a x ,  an 
agricultural bank,  and the dredging of the harbors of  C re te .  ^  j n D e c e m ­
ber of 1868 ,  the  Turks issue d  a se r ie s  of reforms c a l le d  the "O rg an ic  
S t a t u t e . "  They promised the Cretans a government balanced beitween 
Christ ian  and M oslem , more lo c a l  ru le ,  mixed tr ibunals  to handle le g a l  
inve st ig a t io n s  , and the c e s s a t i o n  of a l l  relig ious p ersecut ion  and 
op p re ss iv e  t a x a t i o n . '* 7'7 Elliot bel ieved that most Cretans would a c c e p t  
a reformed Ottoman adminis tration and that only th o se  who favored union 
with G ree ce  were continuing the r e b e l l io n .  The Ottoman empire was 
portrayed, in Brit ish public  docum ents ,  in a favorable  l igh t ,  whi le  the 
Cretan rebels  were s e e n  as  only se ek in g  union with the corrupt and b a n k ­
rupt Greek kingdom.
^ I b i d . , no. 32 ,  El l io tt  to S t a n l e y , December  30 , 1 8 67 .
^^Further Correspondence Respect ing the D is tu rb an ce s  in C r e te :
1867 , in c lo su re  in no. 2 4 ,  El liott  to D ic k s o n ,  D ecem ber  16, 1 867 .
^ M a r r io t t ,  The Eastern  Q u e s t i o n , p. 3 7 6 .
7 8C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  Respect ing  the D i s turbances  in C r e t e , no.  73,  
E l l io t t  to S t a n le y ,  March 8 , 1868 .
Doth Loid Stanley «:»u Luiu Clarendon knew that the key to bringing 
about a satisfactory conclusion to the Cretan rebellion was getting 
Greece to stop her aid to the rebels . Neither foreign secretary wanted 
to force the Greeks to cease  their aid, but they were not averse to seeing 
the Turks coerce the Greeks , although it had to be done without a war or 
a major humiliation for the Greeks. On December 10, 1868, the exasper­
ated Turks issued an ultimatum to the Greeks , who had been acting with 
lit tle discretion because they believed that the powers would protect the 
Greek s ta te .  The Porte demanded the dispersion of all volunteer units 
for Crete within five days,  a ban on their formation in the future, the 
dismantling of the blockade runners , the return of all Cretan refugees , 
punishment for those who had attacked a Turkish officer at Syra , and a 
promise that the Greeks conduct themselves according to existing
7  Q
treaties . J The Greeks refused the terms , and relations were broken off 
immediately
Agreeing with Stanley's basic  ideals ,  Lord Clarendon, the r. . 
foreign secretary, attempted to insure that British interests woi.d not 
be harmed in any way by the settlement of the threatened wa* end the 
resolution of the Cretan rebellion. Napoleon III proposed a convention 
to mediate the differences between Turkey and Greece.  Clarendon 
reluctantly agreed to this meeting and successful ly  for elated the ground 
rules for the coming congress in which he hoped to stop the Russians from 7
7 9The Times (London), December I f ,  1868, p
expanding the scope of the proceedings to include the whole Eastern 
Question. The integrity of tne Ottoman empire under all circumstances 
was not to be violated, ®^and no force was to be used to enforce the 
decisions of the powers. While they were meeting, the British 
restrained the Tur:<s and warned them not to take any inhumane measures 
against the Greeks living in the Ottoman empire, * 812but the British 
government refused to go so far as to accept responsibility for the 
protection of these Greeks.®"
The powers met in Paris on January 9, 1869 and decided that Turkey 
was justified in her ultimatum to Greece ,  but they refused to force Greece 
to fulfill the uicimacum's terms. 8  ̂ The conference condemned Greece 's 
act ions ,  but it also seemed to offer Turkey an invitation to teach the 
Greeks a les so n .  if the Turks defeated the Greeks, their victory would
o n
ouGreat Britain, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers , LXIV 
(1868-69),  Correspondence Respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations 
Between Turkey and Greece ,  1868 — 69 [hereafter cited as Correspondence 
Respecting the Rupsure of Diplomatic Relations Between Turkey and 
Greece , 186 8 - 6 9 1, no. 51 ,  Clarendon to Lyons , December 23 ,  1868.
81 Ibid. , no. ~3, Clarendon to Lyons, December 29, 1868.
82Ibid. , no. 100, Elliot:  to Clarendon, December 24 ,  1868.
82Ibid. , no. 146, Clarendon to E l i o t t ,  January 18, 1869.
8 bid . , incicsures in nos. 13 7 -8 0 ,  protocols of the conference, 
January 9 -20 ,  1869.
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cause such European alarm that the powers would be forced to Intervene. 
Since this might involve destruction o f the Ottoman empire, the British 
applied strong pressure on the Porte to give the Greeks an opportunity 
to comply.  ̂6
After much unobtrusive pressure from the powers , the Greeks 
reluctantly gave in and fulfilled the condition^ that Turkey demanded.
W thout Greek support, the Cretan rebellion died and an uneasy peace 
we 3 restored to the island. Lord Lyons commented that by remaining 
neutral and restraining the other powers, Great Britain followed a "wise  
anc humane" policy?'’
Stanley and Clarendon had persistently linked their policies with 
humanitarianism and service to humanity. They also managed to get the 
mid • Victorians to accept  some actions that were not superficially human- 
i t a r a n ,  such as Britain's failure to aid in refugee removal. Above all 
else , England was determined to maintain the Ottoman empire and the 
balance of power m Europe. To help the Cretans leave the empire could 
cause the Turkish state to dissolve into its heterogeneous parts. Its 
s u f je c t s  would suffer greatly and the powers would go to war to divide the 
empire among themselves.  The Cretan uprising was a lso  a hopeless 
re rolt and aid would only prolong the suffering of the islanders .
8 ^Correspondence Respecting the Rupaire of Diplomatic Relations 
F etween Turkey and G r e e c e , no. 181, Clarendon to Elliott ,  February 6, 
" .869. 8
8 '’ibid . , no. 208, Lyons to Clarendon, February 23, 1869.
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Fo help even in t-hp removal of refugees was not humanitarian, since 
they were transported to Greece where their condition was worse than it 
was on Crete.  For these reasons and because of the jealousy and 
suspicion toward the other powers, the British government a t t e m p t e d  t o  
restrict their intervention. The best course of action for the British was 
t o  u r g e  t h e  Ottoman government to offer conciliation and reasonable 
concessions to the Cretans. To suppress immediate feelings of sympathy 
in favor of the long-range benefits of non-intervention was made to look 
like the most humanitarian course of action. Since se l f - in terest  dictated 
non-intervention and the defeat of the solutions of the other powers,
Lord Stanley naturally used any character is tic  of the mid-Victorians as a 
defense of his policy. His use of humanitarian reasons to defeat human­
itarian objections to non-intervention was a skillful and helpful s u c c e s s .
CHAPTER IV
Conclusion
Mid-Victorian humanitarian sentiment was an essentia l element 
in the unique equilibrium of British society from 1851 to 1867. The 
ideals of the Evangelical revival, which had become part of every 
Englishman, suggested humanitarian philanthropy as a means of 
atonement and a way :o alleviate the worst abuses of the industrial 
revolution without destroying individualism. British poli tic ians ,  re­
sponding to this sentiment, respected its strength and ex istence  by 
making their policies appear to be in the best interests of human beings. 
This desire to help Suffering people extended to foreign affairs .  The 
British government, therefore,  had to manipulate mid-Victorian sentiment 
so that it protected policies based essent ia l ly  on se l f - in terest .  The 
government's response to the Syrian massacres and the Cretan rebellion 
and the defense of its policy verify the desire of the government to make 
se l f ish  ob ject ives appear to be in the interests of suffering people.
British se l f - in terest  dictated that the Ottoman empire continue to 
e x is t ,  thus avoiding ar.y answer to the Eastern Question. The only way 
that this corrupt and ineff ic ient empire could continue to exist was by 
reforming its administration. Therefore, Britain was a staunch supporter 
of Ottoman reform.
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These attempts at reform eventually broke down; the perfidy, 
incapacity , and corruption of the Turkish administration permitted 
Moslems to massacre thousands of Christians in Lebanon and Syria.
When the French requested British cooperation to send a European expe­
ditionary force to help restore order, Lord John Russell reluctantly agreed. 
Although he was somewhat fearful of offending mid-Victorian humanitarian 
sentiment if he did not help in Syria, the foreign secretary real ly wanted 
to limit the ambitions of France and to see that the integrity of the 
Ottoman empire was not permanently violated. Russell  remained suspi­
cious of Napoleon throughout the cr is is  , but always defended his action 
by citing the humanitananism of going to the aid of the Christians of 
Syria and Lebanon. After Fuad Pasha, with aid from the European 
expeditionary force,  had restored order and some tranquility to Syria,  
Russell  tried to get the French to evacuate as soon as possib le .  Despite 
a strong desire to accomplish this,  Russell  hesitated to force a hasty 
evacuation because he was afraid of the sympathy that might be aroused 
by a renewal of the m assacres .  By June 10, 1861, however, the French 
had successful ly  fulfilled the ob ject ives of protecting the Ottoman 
empire and of appearing to respond to humanitarian considerations, so 
the troops could safely be withdrawn.
Five years later ,  a rebellion oroke out on Crete.  This revolt sought 
a nat ionalistic reunion with Greece ,  but British se l f - in terest  demanded 
that there could not be any precedents for aid to groups trying to leave
the Ottoman empire. Lord Stanley cried to protect Britain's interests by
pursuing a policy of non-intervention and by defeating, as much as 
possib le ,  the plans of the other powers. The foreign secretary defended 
his efforts by claiming that it was more humanitarian not to intervene 
than to intervene. He consistently condemned aid to the rebels as 
merely prolonging the bloodshed in a futile revolt against legitimate 
authority. Reunion with Greece was portrayed in official  dispatches as 
■' " staying in tb • mar - Stanley a-sV̂  ’ •••• it
could be a real aid to the Cretans to transfer them tc that chaotic and 
corrupt s tate .  Britain even avoided the removal of refugees from the 
war area by pointing to their eventual destination. Stanley did not want 
to help the rebels in any manner, and he considered even this aid as an 
encouragement to a doomed rebellion. After three years of bloody and 
devastating warfare, the Cretan rebellion died out.  Although appearing 
humanitarian, Stanley had successful ly  fulfilled his goal,  since Crete 
remained in the Ottoman empire.
In these two instances , British se l f - in terest  was not totally contrary 
to the interests of the natives of the Ottoman empire. The expedition 
that was sent to Syria did help restore order and some security to the 
province, and it was doubtful that the Cretan refugees would have been 
much better off in Greece than on Crete.  The British government was 
capable,  however, of playing upon the ideals and sentiment of the 
English people to defend policies that were in Britain's favor, but not 
necessarily in the best interests of the recipients .  In other words , the 
government was quite ready to sacrif ice  some group, if the interest of
Britain demanded suer, a response. The foreign secretary might then 
make even this sacr i : ; ce  acceptable if he could make the policy appeal 
to a characterist ic  belief of his contemporaries. Humanitarianism was 
a mid-\/ictorian characteris tic ,  and British foreign secretaries did use 
it to cloak se lf - in terest  in respectabil ity.
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